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Cynthia E. Jones*
Many state innocence protection statutes give courts the power to impose
appropriate sanctions when biological evidence needed for postconviction
DNA testing is wrongly destroyed by the government. Constitutional claims
based on wrongful evidence destruction are governed by the virtually
insurmountable "bad faith" standard articulated in Arizona v.
Youngblood. The wrongful destruction of DNA evidence in contravention
of state innocence protection laws, however, should be governed by the
standards used to adjudicate other "access to evidence" violations in
criminal cases, including disclosures mandated by the rules of criminal
procedure, the Jencks Act, and Brady v. Maryland. Under the "access to
evidence" sanctions analysis, courts must balance the degree of
government culpability in the destruction, the degree of prejudice to the
defense, and the strength of the government's case. In applying this
analysis to the wrongful destruction of evidence needed for postconviction
DNA testing, courts should give due weight to the exclusive power of DNA
evidence to discredit other forms of evidence and prove identity to a
scientific certainty. Further, in evaluating the strength of the government's
evidence at trial, courts must carefully scrutinize guilt determinations based
largely or exclusively on evidence that has been the predominate cause of
wrongful convictions, including stranger eyewitness identifications, non-
DNA forensic evidence, uncorroborated confessions, and jailhouse
informant testimony. Applying these critical lessons learned from over 200
exonerations to the sanctions determination, appropriate sanctions for the
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support and guidance. I also want to thank Associate Dean Mark Niles, Professor Adam
Thurschwell, Professor Ira P. Robbins, and Professor Andy Taslitz for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank my wonderful and resourceful
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support and assistance in advancing my scholarship.
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wrongful destruction of DNA evidence include a sentence reduction, a new
trial, or dismissal.
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INTRODUCTION
Robin Lovitt was convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and scheduled
to be executed on November 30, 2005.1 Mr. Lovitt would have had the
dubious distinction of being the one thousandth condemned prisoner
executed in the United States under the modem death penalty. 2 On the eve
of Lovitt's scheduled execution, Virginia Governor Mark Warner
commuted Lovitt's death sentence to a sentence of life in prison without the
1. See Lovitt v. True (Lovitt II1), 330 F. Supp. 2d 603, 606 (E.D. Va. 2004); Press
Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., U.S. Death Penalty Continues Steady Decline as 1000th
Execution Approaches 3 (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/DPIC 1 000thPR.pdf.
2. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 1, at 3.
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possibility of parole. 3 Now Robin Lovitt will spend every day of his life in
prison for a murder that he may have been able to prove he did not commit.
We will never know for sure whether Mr. Lovitt is guilty because the only
piece of credible evidence that could have established the true identity of
the killer-blood left on the murder weapon-was destroyed before it could
be subjected to definitive DNA testing.
4
Following his conviction and death sentence, Lovitt was entitled under
the Virginia innocence protection statute to challenge his conviction by
having the biological evidence in his case retested using more advanced
forensic testing than was available at the time of his trial. 5 While Mr.
Lovitt's case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the state trial
court clerk's office intentionally destroyed all of the biological evidence
needed for DNA testing "to create additional [storage] space" 6 in the
courthouse evidence storage room. Moreover, the destruction was unlawful
under a newly enacted Virginia statute that expressly requires preservation
of biological evidence in death penalty cases until after the prisoner is
executed. 7 Although this new law was enacted nearly three weeks before
the Lovitt evidence was destroyed, 8 the court clerk responsible for the
evidence destruction claimed that he was simply not aware of the new law
at the time he arranged for the evidence to be destroyed.9
While Lovitt was harmed by the evidence destruction, incredibly, he was
not entitled to any remedy under the law. The same Virginia statute that
permits prisoners to seek postconviction DNA testing and mandates
preservation of biological evidence also precludes prisoners from seeking
legal relief if the evidence is destroyed in violation of the statute.10 The
Virginia Supreme Court found that the evidence preservation law was
3. Press Release, Governor Mark R. Warner, Statement of Governor Warner on the
Clemency Petition of Robin Lovitt (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Warner Press Release],
available at http://wayback.archive-it.org/190/20051202214623/http://www.govemor.
virginia.gov/Press_.Policy/Releases/2005/Nov05/1129c.htm.
4. See Lovitt v. Warden (Lovitt 11), 585 S.E.2d 801, 809 (Va. 2003).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.3 (2008) (Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence).
6. Lovitt Ill, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
7. This preservation statute states,
In the case of a person sentenced to death, the court that entered the judgment
shall, in all cases, order any human biological evidence or representative samples
to be transferred by the governmental entity having custody to the Department of
Forensic Science. The Department of Forensic Science shall store, preserve, and
retain such evidence until the judgment is executed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1.B. The preservation statute became effective on May 2,
2001. Id. The evidence destruction order was signed on May 21, 2001, and the evidence was
destroyed a few days later. Lovitt III, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
8. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 809.
9. Id. at 809-10.
10. The Virginia evidence preservation statute states, in relevant part,
An action under this section... shall not form the basis for relief in any habeas
corpus or appellate proceeding. Nothing in this section shall create any cause of
action for damages against the Commonwealth, or any of its political subdivisions
or officers, employees or agents of the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1.E.
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enacted solely to "protect the efficacy of the appellate process, as well as
the need to preserve evidence for use in the event of a retrial or other
proceeding allowed by law.""l  The court concluded that the Virginia
legislature, in enacting the statute, "recognized that noncompliance with
those [evidence preservation] procedures may occur and provided statutory
language plainly excluding any such noncompliance as a basis for appellate
or habeas corpus relief."'12 In granting Lovitt's request for clemency,
Governor Warner echoed the sentiment expressed by the court, stating, "I
believe the courts have correctly ruled that the law requiring the
maintenance of such evidence does not provide relief for a defendant in Mr.
Lovitt's circumstances."1 3 Governor Warner further stated that clemency
was nonetheless appropriate because "the actions of an agent of the
Commonwealth, in a manner contrary to the express direction of the law,"
caused the destruction of evidence before Lovitt "exhausted every legal
post-trial remedy."'
14
The destruction of evidence in Lovitt v. True15 illustrates how
mismanagement of evidence in the criminal justice system conflicts with
the legal reforms mandated by newly enacted "innocence protection" laws.
In the wake of numerous DNA exonerations of the wrongly convicted, 16
federal and state innocence protection statutes have been enacted in nearly
every jurisdiction in the United States. 17  These remedial laws seek to
11. Lovitt 11, 585 S.E.2dat 816.
12. Id.
13. Warner Press Release, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. 330 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2004). Robin Lovitt's case produced multiple
dispositions, see Lovitt v. True (Lovitt IV), 403 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2005); Lovitt III, 330 F.
Supp. 2d 603; Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d 801; Lovitt v. Commonwealth (Lovitt 1), 537 S.E.2d 866,
870 (Va. 2000), but the case will be referred to in text as Lovitt.
16. See The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2009). The
Innocence Project reports that 234 wrongly convicted people have been exonerated by DNA
evidence. Id. In the last decade, there has been an average of fourteen exonerations each
year in cases from almost every state in the country. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200
EXONERATED: Too MANY WRONGLY CONVICTED passim (n.d.), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/ip-200.pdf. These individuals served an average of
twelve years in prison before exoneration and release. The Innocence Project, News and
Information, supra. Exonerations have been won in thirty-three states, and there have been
169 exonerations since the year 2000. Id.
17. Postconviction innocence protection laws or "DNA access" statutes now exist in the
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4131 to -4135 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008), in all
federal prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006), and in forty-five states. See ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4240 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to -208 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1405 (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-411 to -415 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 54-102jj to -102pp (Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 925.11 (West Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c) (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
844D-121 to -126 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4902 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/116-5 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); IOWA
CODE § 810.10 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.285,
422.287 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2008); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2136-2138 (2003 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
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protect the innocent by giving prisoners access to biological evidence (i.e.,
blood, saliva, semen, and vaginal swabs) in the possession of the
government, the right to have the evidence subjected to DNA testing, and
the right to present exculpatory test results in court to obtain relief from a
wrongful conviction.' 8 While the law in some states still does not require
the government to preserve evidence in criminal cases after the case is
closed, a growing number of state laws now mandate that biological
evidence be preserved for postconviction DNA testing. 19
As Lovitt demonstrates, notwithstanding the new laws mandating
evidence preservation, biological evidence is still routinely discarded in the
criminal justice system. Compliance with innocence protection laws
requires a major overhaul of current evidence management practices in
order to ensure that biological evidence is available for postconviction
DNA testing. With few notable exceptions, this reform has not yet
occurred. 20  Thus, the widespread loss and destruction of biological
evidence presents one of the greatest impediments to the use of DNA
technology to exonerate the wrongly convicted in America
21
201 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.16 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 590.01-590.06 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035 (2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4116 to -4125 (2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 176.0918 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-D:1 to 651-D:4
(LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-1A-2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-32.1-01 to -15 (2006); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71 to .81 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
1371-1372 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.085(1)(e) (West 2007); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9543.1 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11 (Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-28-350 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-304 to -313 (2006); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 64.01 to .05 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-300 to -304
(2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5561 (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 974.07 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-12-302 to -315 (2008). Only five states-Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, and South Dakota-still do not have laws that expressly give prisoners the right
to DNA testing.
18. See generally Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The
Preservation of Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1239, 1248-52 (2005) (discussing the widespread adoption of innocence protection
statutes as part of a national reform effort to protect the rights of prisoners seeking
postconviction DNA exoneration).
19. Approximately half of all states with innocence protection laws mandate some form
of postconviction evidence preservation. See The Innocence Project, Preservation of
Evidence, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/253.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2009);
see also Jones, supra note 18, at 1253-57 (evaluating the merits of the various evidence
preservation provisions in state innocence protection statutes).
20. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
21. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 46 (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/177626.pdf (stating that "[a] major barrier to conducting
DNA testing is that.., the evidence has been destroyed or cannot easily be found"); Teresa
N. Chen, The Youngblood Success Stories: Overcoming the "Bad Faith" Destruction of
Evidence Standard, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 421, 422 (2007) (noting that "[diestruction of
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This Article addresses the role courts should play in enforcing the
evidence preservation requirements mandated by innocence protection laws
and provides an analytical framework for the judicial determination of
whether to impose sanctions and what sanction is appropriate when
biological evidence has been destroyed. While a growing number of
innocence protection laws give courts the broad authority to impose
"appropriate sanctions" 22 for the destruction of biological evidence, 23 these
remedial statutes are still relatively new (most enacted since 2002) and
courts have yet to exercise their sanctioning power. Part I discusses the
"access to evidence" doctrine, which defines the scope of the government's
duty to preserve and disclose evidence to the defense in criminal cases.
Provisions for access to evidence include pretrial disclosures mandated by
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the disclosure of
witness statements pursuant to Jencks statutes, and the disclosure of
material, exculpatory information under Brady v. Maryland.24 An integral
part of the access to evidence doctrine is the duty to preserve discoverable
evidence and the court's power to enforce preservation and disclosure
evidence is the number one problem faced by Innocence Project attorneys"); Jones, supra
note 18, at 1242-46 (describing traditional state evidence preservation practices). See
generally THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, LESSONS NOT LEARNED: AN INNOCENCE PROJECT
REPORT 26 (n.d.), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NY-innocence-report.pdf
(stating that "[e]vidence that can be subjected to DNA testing ... is often lost, destroyed or
impossible to locate in New York State").
22. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-122 ("The intentional destruction of evidence after
entry of the [court] order shall constitute grounds for appropriate sanctions, including
contempt of court...."); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
38-7-14; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.285, 422.287; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138.2;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2(F); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-309.
23. The innocence protection statutes that have been enacted in some jurisdictions
prescribe criminal penalties as the sole remedy for the wrongful destruction of biological
evidence. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4134(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) ("Whoever willfully
or maliciously destroys, alters, conceals, or tampers with evidence that is required to be
preserved under this section with the intent to (1) impair the integrity of that evidence, (2)
prevent that evidence from being subjected to DNA testing, or (3) prevent the production or
use of that evidence in an official proceeding, shall be subject to a fine of $100,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both."). In other iurisdictions, the statute has no
enforcement provision for the duty to preserve evidence. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
925.11 (4)(a) (West Supp. 2009) (mandating that the government "maintain any physical
evidence collected at the time of the crime for which a postsentencing testing of DNA may
be requested" but providing no remedy if evidence is destroyed prior to DNA testing). Even
in the absence of an express grant of statutory authority to impose sanctions, courts have the
inherent supervisory power to impose sanctions on the government for the wrongful
destruction of evidence in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 687 F.2d 1356,
1359 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Kennedy, J., concurring); JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 246
(1989); see also FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF
THE JUDICIARY 24-26, 37 (1994); Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and
Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1123-24
(1987). But see, e.g., Ali v. State, No. M2005-01137-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 1626652, at
*2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2006) (stating that in the absence of an express sanctions
provision in the statute, there is no remedy for the petitioner when biological evidence is
destroyed after conviction but before a postconviction DNA analysis petition).
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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obligations with sanctions. As discussed in Part II, the evidence
preservation and disclosure duties mandated by innocence protection laws
impose a new postconviction discovery obligation on the government,
which falls within the scope of the access to evidence doctrine. The well-
established, flexible standards used by courts to adjudicate other access to
evidence violations should likewise guide the determination of sanctions for
the wrongful destruction of biological evidence needed for DNA testing.
Part III uses the case of Robin Lovitt to illustrate the application of the
access to evidence analysis to the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence in
violation of postconviction innocence protection laws. Part IV discusses
the three sanctions available to the court to remedy the wrongful destruction
of DNA evidence: sentence reduction, new trial, and dismissal (vacating
the conviction).
I. THE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
25
As one legal scholar aptly noted,
From the moment a criminal investigation begins, the accused is
disadvantaged by lack of access to crime scene evidence and investigative
resources. By the time a suspect is accused or charged, the crime scene
has usually been fully processed by police and relevant evidence has been
taken into police custody. Criminal defendants lack both access to the
evidence and to police assistance in developing additional evidence. If
the crime scene is to yield evidence of innocence, the defendant typically
will have to rely on police and prosecutors to find, collect, develop, and
disclose that evidence.
26
Because of this imbalance of access to relevant evidence, either before
trial or during the adjudication phase of the case, the government is required
to disclose to the defense certain evidence collected during the investigation
of the crime. Prosecutors are ultimately responsible for ensuring that this
discoverable evidence is properly preserved and can be produced in court.
27
25. The civil corollary to the disclosure provisions encompassed by the access to
evidence doctrine is principally embodied in Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which gives trial courts broad authority to impose a wide range of sanctions for
discovery violations, including dismissal. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. When discoverable evidence
has been destroyed in civil cases (also referred to as "spoliation of evidence"), courts have a
flexible, discretionary sanctioning scheme to redress the discovery violations. See GORELICK
ET AL., supra note 23, at 5; MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
passim (Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2d ed. 2006); J. D. Page & Doug Sigel, The Inherent and
Express Powers of Courts to Sanction, 31 S. TEX. L. REv. 43 (1990); see also Solum &
Marzen, supra note 23, at 1085.
26. Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and
the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 898 (2008).
27. E.g., United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 72 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing United
States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1991)) (noting that the ultimate responsibility
for disclosure of discoverable material rests with the prosecutor and any failure to preserve
evidence for disclosure will fall squarely on the shoulders of the prosecuting attorney); see
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This obligation extends to law enforcement officers, property clerks,
evidence custodians, lab technicians, and all others directly responsible for
the storage and retention of evidence.28 Most tangible evidence subject to
disclosure is stored in government property rooms and maintained by low-
level evidence handlers who lack resources to preserve the high volume of
evidence and often operate without clear guidelines on how (and how long)
to preserve evidence. 29 Too frequently, poor handling of evidence by
untrained or undertrained evidence custodians results in the negligent loss
or the premature destruction of evidence in the ordinary course of
business. 30 At the other extreme, control of overcrowded evidence rooms
has been accomplished by resort to massive "evidence purges" to create
storage space. These purges have been instituted across the country and, by
some estimates, have resulted in the premature destruction of biological
evidence in six thousand rape and murder cases over the last decade.
31
Moreover, as Lovitt illustrates, 32 even after laws are enacted mandating
evidence preservation, if evidence custodians are given no guidance on
what evidence to preserve, they continue long-standing practices of
destroying old evidence at will to create storage space. It is against this
backdrop of miscommunication and disorganization that discoverable
biological evidence needed for postconviction DNA testing is permanently
lost or purposely destroyed.
Notwithstanding the pervasive problems with the proper storage and
retention of evidence, a series of constitutional mandates, court rules, and
state and federal statutes give courts the power to enforce the government's
also United States v. Bryant (Bryant 1), 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1182
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
28. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. at 64 (holding that a Maine state police officer was
"functionally part of the United States Attorney's prosecutorial team," and his possession
and destruction of a Jencks statement "must be imputed to the government").
29. Without an efficient cataloging and tracking system, retrieval of evidence is virtually
impossible in overcrowded property rooms filled to the brim with stockpiles of old evidence.
The Denver Post national study of the problem of evidence destruction identified thirty-one
innocent men who needlessly spent a total of over 166 years in prison because the DNA
evidence in their cases was lost. Miles Moffeit & Susan Greene, Trashing the Truth: Room
for Error, DENVER POST, July 23, 2007, at 1A; Trashing the Truth: Prisoners Denied DNA
Testing After Evidence Goes Missing, DENVER POST, July 25, 2007,
http://www.denverpost.com/evidence/ci_6453427; see also Jones, supra note 18, at 1245
nn.28-32 (discussing cases of "formerly lost" biological evidence later used to exonerate the
wrongly convicted). The Denver Post's extensive coverage of DNA evidence destruction,
including copies of its print and online stories and documentary videos, are available at
Trashing the Truth (Evidence Project), DENVER POST, http://www.denverpost.com/evidence
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
30. Jones, supra note 18, at 1243 nn.20-21 (discussing both pretrial and postconviction
evidence destruction in criminal cases).
3 1. Moffeit & Greene, supra note 29. The jurisdictions that have instituted "evidence
purges" include New York, New Orleans, Colorado Springs, Los Angeles, and Houston. Id.
The full scope of lost evidence will never be known because state and local governments do
not require police departments and other criminal justice evidence custodians to track and
report the evidence they destroy. Miles Moffeit & Susan Greene, Trashing the Truth: Foiled
Justice, DENVER POST, July 24, 2007, at 1A.
32. Lovitt v. True (Lovitt II1), 330 F. Supp. 2d 603, 631 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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evidence disclosure obligations. These laws are collectively referred to as
the "access to evidence" doctrine.33 The three main tenets of the access to
evidence doctrine are the right to pretrial discovery under Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 34 the right to disclosure of witness
statements at trial pursuant to the Jencks Act, 35 and, under Brady v.
Maryland,36 the constitutional right to timely disclosure of exculpatory
information.37 Each of these disclosure provisions advances the goal of
giving the defendant equal access to relevant information to ensure
accuracy and promote fairness in the adversarial adjudication process.
38
Two cases define the scope of the access to evidence doctrine. First, in
United States v. Bryant,39 the court established baseline standards for the
adjudication of access to evidence violations. Second, in Arizona v.
Youngblood,40 the Supreme Court placed significant restrictions on the
scope of constitutional protection against the denial of access to evidence.
41
33. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (discussing
"constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence" under the due process clause); United States
v. Bryant (Bryant 1), 439 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (stating that "[a]ccess by defense counsel to certain evidence gathered by the
Government is protected by both constitutional and statutory safeguards," including Brady v.
Maryland, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Jencks Act).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; see infra Part I.A.
35. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); see infra Part I.B.
36. See infra Part I.C.
37. Other statutorily protected "access to evidence" provisions include the Bill of
Particulars, FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f), which allows the defense to obtain more detailed
information related to the charges in the indictment, and Rule 17(c), which gives the defense
the right to issue pretrial subpoenas to access documents and other materials needed properly
to prepare a defense. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154-55 (1972) (finding that other constitutionally protected "access to evidence" rights
include the right to the disclosure of plea agreements with government witnesses); Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957) (discussing the limited right to disclosure of the
identity of undercover informants). See generally JAMES CISSELL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
187-227 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 6th ed. 2003) (1983).
38. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S 68, 77 (1985) (stating that "mere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process"
when the defendant is denied "the raw materials integral to the building of an effective
defense"); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (noting that the "access to
evidence" doctrine was developed to allow criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense"); Bryant I, 439 F.2d at 648 (stating that the purpose of the
disclosure duty is "not simply to correct an imbalance of advantage, whereby the prosecution
may surprise the defense at trial with new evidence; rather, it is also to make of the trial a
search for truth informed by all relevant material, much of which, because of imbalance in
investigative resources, will be exclusively in the hands of the Government"); see also Sara
Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1450
(1984) (noting that "the ends of justice are defeated if judgments are founded on a
speculative, partial version of the facts"); Solum & Marzen, supra note 23, at 1138 (stating
that "[o]ur legal system presupposes that accuracy of fact-finding is usually proportionate to
the amount of relevant evidence considered").
39. 439 F.2d 642.
40. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
41. Id. at 58-59.
2901
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In Bryant, although the government secretly audiotaped the drug
transaction between the defendant and an undercover officer, the officers
intentionally did not preserve the recording because they did not realize the
recording was discoverable evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit noted at the outset of the opinion that "this is
not a case of a good faith effort to preserve highly relevant evidence,
frustrated only by inadvertent loss. Rather, it is a case of intentional non-
preservation .... -42 The Bryant court first rejected the government's
contention that its disclosure obligation was alleviated by the fact that it
was no longer in possession of the evidence. The court ruled that under the
access to evidence doctrine, the government's duty to disclose evidence
encompasses a duty to preserve evidence. 43 The court reasoned that,
[T]he duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the Government has
first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question.
Otherwise, disclosure might be avoided by destroying vital evidence
before prosecution begins or before defendants hear of its existence.
Hence we hold that before a request for discovery has been made, the
duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation. Only if evidence
is carefully preserved during the early stages of investigation will
disclosure be possible later. 44
Next, the court in Bryant held that whether sanctions are to be imposed
will depend upon an examination of the circumstances surrounding the loss
or destruction of the material. In making this determination the lower court
should weigh three factors: (1) "the degree of negligence or bad faith
involved"; (2) "the importance of the evidence lost"; and (3) "the evidence
of guilt adduced at trial."'45 The analytical framework instituted by the
Bryant court had a fundamental impact on the development of the access to
evidence doctrine. 46 The Bryant court's multipronged, balanced approach
to determining whether to impose sanctions was widely embraced by state
and federal courts47 and continues to be the prevailing standard used by
42. Bryant I, 439 F.2d at 647.
43. Id. at 651.
44. Id. (citing United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 1965)).
45. Id. at 653.
46. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 245 (claiming that Bryant "is noteworthy as
the high-water mark of judicial attempts to establish clear limits" on destruction of
evidence); Jean Wegman Bums, Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or
Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 542, 562 (1972) (arguing that the Bryant
approach "is an attempt to bring structure and systematic rules to the pretrial period, which
the court saw to be 'a dark no-man's-land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary
decision making' (quoting Bryant I, 439 F.2d at 644)); Comment, Criminal Procedure:
Government Has Duty to Implement Effective Guidelines to Preserve Discoverable
Evidence, 1971 DUKE L.J. 644, 652 (noting that Bryant "did provide a procedure which may
significantly reduce the likelihood" of a loss of evidence).
47. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 962 (4th ed. 2004).
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courts in deciding whether to impose sanctions in criminal cases for the
destruction of discoverable evidence.
48
Just as Bryant had a significant impact on the development of the access
to evidence doctrine, the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v.
Youngblood severely restricted the constitutional remedies available when
evidence is wrongly destroyed by the government. In Youngblood, the
Court stated that the government's destruction of mere "potentially useful"
evidence does not violate due process unless the evidence had an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed and
the government destroyed the evidence in "bad faith."'49  The Court
described evidence that is merely "potentially useful" as "evidentiary
material of which no more can be said than that it could have been
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant." 50 The Youngblood Court described the "bad faith" requirement
as mandating that the defendant demonstrate that "the police themselves by
their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating
the defendant. ' 51 Thus, the Court held that "[t]he presence or absence of
bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must
necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the
evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." 52 The Court emphasized that
this stringent standard is necessary to avoid unreasonably "imposing on the
police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all
material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular
prosecution. '5
3
The Youngblood bad faith requirement has posed a virtually
insurmountable burden on defendants seeking to demonstrate that the
government's destruction of evidence violated due process. 54 Although
Youngblood has been both widely criticized by legal scholars 55 and
48. In United States v. Bryant, the court found that the government's failure to disclose
the audiotape violated the Jencks Act, Rule 16, as well as the Due Process Clause. Bryant I,
439 F.2d at 647; see also United States v. Bryant (Bryant I1), 448 F.2d 1182, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (per curiam). After Arizona v. Youngblood, the Bryant I court's due process analysis
is no longer valid. Although Bryant still governs nonconstitutional violations of Rule 16 and
Jencks, the holding in Youngblood now governs "constitutionally guaranteed" access to
evidence violations under the Due Process Clause.
49. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. at 58.
52. Id. at 56 n.* (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
53. Id. at 58.
54. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 342-53 (Supp. 2008);
(stating that the Youngblood standard has proven to be "difficult, if not impossible, to meet"
and citing numerous state and federal cases finding that the destruction of evidence did not
meet the Youngblood bad faith standard); Chen, supra note 21, at 422 (stating that, of 1675
published cases citing Youngblood, in only seven reported cases did the court find that the
bad faith standard had been met).
55. E.g., Chen, supra note 21, at 422; see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 54, at 319-
53; Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 713, 768-71 (1999); id. at 769 (arguing that destruction of evidence by the government
under the Youngblood standard will not violate due process unless the exculpatory nature of
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expressly rejected by state courts interpreting the due process requirements
for preservation of evidence under state constitutions,56 the vitality of the
Court's holding in Youngblood was reaffirmed by the Court in Illinois v.
Fisher.57 In Fisher, the defendant was charged with possession of a
controlled substance and filed a pretrial discovery request to gain access to
the evidence for independent testing. 58 During the decade the defendant
had absconded prior to trial, however, the government destroyed the
evidence pursuant to its "established procedures. '59 The Court held that the
Youngblood bad faith requirement is not met merely by showing that the
defendant made discovery requests for the evidence prior to destruction.
60
Nor could the defendant prove bad faith simply because the destroyed
evidence was central to the guilt/innocence determination and presented his
"only hope for exoneration." 61
The implications of Youngblood and Fisher are dire in the area of
postconviction DNA testing. Destruction of old biological evidence usually
occurs after the defendant has been convicted, but before the evidence is
subjected to DNA testing. Untested biological evidence is quintessentially
evidence that is only "potentially exculpatory." 62  Fisher also seems to
foreclose any notion that the Court might carve out an exception to the
virtually insurmountable bad faith requirement for untested biological
evidence because of the unique power of DNA evidence to prove guilt or
innocence to a scientific certainty. The Court stated in Fisher that the bad
faith requirement is not dependent on "the centrality of the contested
evidence to the prosecution's case or the defendant's defense, but on the
distinction between 'material exculpatory' evidence" protected by the
Brady doctrine, and "'potentially useful' evidence governed by
Youngblood.
63
The resolution of the destruction of evidence issues in Lovitt further
illustrates the extremely narrow scope of the constitutional protection
against evidence destruction. At the Lovitt postconviction hearing on the
destruction of evidence, Lovitt unsuccessfully tried to show bad faith with
the evidence is so apparent "that a court could infer the government knew that this particular
evidence was required to mount a defense").
56. Several states (Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Vermont) have rejected the Youngblood bad faith standard in
interpreting the protection afforded to criminal defendants against the destruction of
evidence under the due process clauses of their respective state constitutions. See Illinois v.
Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 n.* (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (listing state cases rejecting
Youngblood standard). See generally GoRELICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 342-53 (providing
comprehensive, state-by-state analysis of cases applying and rejecting the Youngblood
standard under state constitutions).
57. Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-49.
58. Id. at 545.
59. Id. at 546.
60. Id. at 548.
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 557-58.
63. Id. at 549 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988)).
2904 [Vol. 77
2009] SANCTIONS FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
proof that the biological evidence was intentionally and recklessly
destroyed by the evidence custodian. To that end, Lovitt presented
evidence that Robert McCarthy, the senior court clerk in charge of
preserving the evidence, knew prior to destruction that the evidence was
required to be preserved. McCarthy, a twenty-seven-year veteran clerk and
a seasoned supervisor, testified that for over twenty years he has been the
person in the clerk's office charged with maintaining evidence presented in
court. 6 4  Further, McCarthy testified that, prior to the newly enacted
evidence preservation law, it was the longstanding policy of the clerk's
office to preserve evidence in death penalty cases until after the prisoner
had been executed. 65 McCarthy also testified that he nonetheless believed
he could initiate the process to destroy the evidence once he received the
mandate from the Virginia Supreme Court denying Lovitt's appeal.
66
McCarthy conceded, however, that prior to destruction of the evidence he
did not check the case file to determine whether there was any additional
litigation, nor did he consult with any of Lovitt's attorneys prior to drafting
the order for a judge to authorize destruction of the evidence.
67
Significantly, before McCarthy submitted the evidence destruction order
to the judge, two other deputy court clerks, one of whom was the clerk
assigned to the Lovitt case, repeatedly informed McCarthy that the evidence
should not be destroyed because there was biological evidence in the case,
and because it was a death penalty case in which the prisoner had not been
executed. 68 McCarthy testified that he did not specifically recall these
conversations with his fellow clerks. 69 McCarthy acknowledged, however,
that when the evidence was destroyed, there was plenty of other evidence in
the evidence storage facility from older cases that could have been
discarded to create storage space.
70
In reviewing this record, all state and federal courts unanimously
concluded that, though McCarthy's actions were "erroneous" and "an
exercise of bad judgment," his destruction of the evidence did not constitute
64. Transcript of Record (Vol. 1) at 45, Lovitt v. True (Lovitt I), 585 S.E.2d 801 (Va.
2003) (No. 012663) (evidentiary hearing conducted by Circuit Court of Arlington County
concerning issues raised in habeas case pending before Virginia Supreme Court); see Lovitt
II, 585 S.E.2d at 805 & n. 1 (noting that the court had ordered an evidentiary hearing before
Judge F. Bruce Bach in the Circuit Court of Arlington County regarding "all issues raised in
Lovitt's habeas corpus petition").
65. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 809-10; Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 60.
66. Lovittll, 585 S.E.2d at 809-10; Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 53.
67. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 809; Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 54-55 (stating
that if Robert McCarthy had checked the case file he would have seen six separate
documents reflecting the fact that the case was still being litigated).
68. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 809. This was further corroborated by a fourth clerk who
testified that she heard the conversation in which one of the clerks informed McCarthy that
the evidence in the Lovitt case should not be destroyed. Transcript of Record, supra note 64,
at 38, 43, 62-63.
69. Transcript of Record, supra note 64, at 51.
70. Id. at 53.
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"bad faith" under Youngblood.71 The Virginia Supreme Court found that
McCarthy only sought removal of the evidence to create additional storage
space and did not have the intent to destroy exculpatory evidence. 72 The
court further found that merely because the evidence in the case contained
DNA evidence and the clerk was aware of that fact, without more, did not
prove the clerk was aware "that an analysis of some of the DNA evidence
had produced inconclusive results, or that such evidence may have been
subject to further testing." 73 The court found that the biological evidence
destroyed was merely "potentially exculpatory" and there was but a "mere
possibility" that further testing could have exculpated Lovitt. 74 Therefore,
the court concluded that the intentional destruction of the biological
evidence did not violate the Due Process Clause. 75
While the Youngblood bad faith standard restricts constitutional
protection against evidence destruction, courts have expressly rejected the
notion that a finding of bad faith is needed in order to impose sanctions on
the government for other nondisclosure violations. 76 As discussed more
fully below, the three-prong test articulated in Bryant is the standard used
by courts in imposing sanctions for noncompliance with Rule 16, the Jencks
Act, and the Brady doctrine.
77
71. Lovitt v. True (Lovitt II), 330 F. Supp. 2d 603, 634 (E.D. Va. 2004) (upholding the
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court on collateral attack and questioning whether the
holding in Youngblood even applies to postconviction destruction of evidence); see Lovitt v.
True (Lovitt IV), 403 F.3d 171, 187-88 (4th Cir. 2005); id. at 187 n.3 (affirming the lower
court ruling under Youngblood and noting that while the newly enacted Virginia state
preservation of evidence law "strikes us as a very wise policy--one we expect clerks in the
future will observe-it is not expressive of federal due process standards which govern
Lovitt's claim").
72. Lovitt 1l, 585 S.E.2d at 816; see also Lovitt III, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
73. Lovitt 11, 585 S.E.2d at 816.
74. Id. at 814, 816.
75. Id. at 815; see also Susan Greene & Miles Moffeit, Trashing the Truth: Destruction
of Evidence, DENVER POST, July 22, 2007, at 1A (discussing the case of Clarence Moses-EL
in Colorado, where the evidence was destroyed despite a court order mandating
preservation). In the case of Moses-EL, when he petitioned the court for a new trial,
asserting that the intentional destruction of all testable DNA evidence violated his right to
due process, the court found that law enforcement officers were "negligent" in destroying the
evidence, but that there was no "bad faith." Id.
76. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 1126 (stating that, while the U.S. Supreme
Court sets forth the "minimum constitutionally compelled obligation of the government with
respect to the preservation of potential defense evidence," it is possible that "[a] greater
obligation may flow from state law").
77. See id. at 961-62 (noting that, while destruction of evidence under due process
standards requires a showing of bad faith, states are free to apply a less rigorous standard in
imposing sanctions when there has been a breach of discovery obligations imposed by state
laws).
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A. Criminal Discovery: Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Basic discovery in criminal cases is governed by the rules of criminal
procedure set forth in court rules governing federal and state proceedings.
78
In federal prosecutions, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the government has a pretrial duty to disclose specific
categories of evidence in the government's "possession, custody, or
control" that the government intends to introduce at trial or which would be
material to the preparation of the defense case. 79 The duty of disclosure
mandated by Rule 16 also includes a duty to preserve discoverable
evidence.80 The evidence subject to disclosure under Rule 16 does not have
to be exculpatory as long as the government intends to introduce it at trial.
81
The goal of the discovery rules is to "contribute[] to the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice" by encouraging pleas, avoiding unfair
surprise, and enabling "an accurate determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence."
82
Chief among the disclosure requirements imposed by Rule 16 is
disclosure of the defendant's statements 83 and the defendant's prior
criminal record.8 4 Rule 16 also requires disclosure of tangible objects,
8 5
reports of examinations and tests,86 and the substance of testimony to be
provided by expert witnesses. 87 Judges can impose sanctions to enforce the
government's discovery obligations pursuant to section (d) of the rule.88 In
addition to the enumerated sanctions in section (d), the trial judge also has
the broad discretionary authority to "enter any other order that is just under
the circumstances."8 9 Other sanctions that have been imposed by courts to
redress discovery violations include ordering a new trial, 90 giving an
78. CISSELL, supra note 37, at 188-89.
79. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
80. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 962.
81. 3C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 189 (2008)
(Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
82. Id. at 186.




87. Id. 16(a)(1)(G). Rule 16 also requires the defense to make reciprocal disclosures of
specific categories of information. See, e.g., id. 12.1 (notice of alibi defense); id. 12.2 (notice
of insanity defense). See generally CISSELL, supra note 37, at 194-205.
88. Rule 16(d)(2) states,
If a party fails to comply with this rule, the court may: (A) order that party to
permit the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and
prescribe other just terms and conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that
party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that
is just under the circumstances.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
89. Id. 16(d)(2)(D).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 999, 1001 (1 1th Cir.
1995) (ordering a new trial where government's discovery violation prejudiced the
defendant's right to a fair trial); United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 86 (1st Cir. 1993)
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adverse inference instruction, 91 and complete dismissal of criminal
charges. 92  Absent egregious misconduct resulting in prejudice to the
defense, dismissals are extremely rare for violations of the criminal
discovery rules.93 Discovery violations are usually litigated during pretrial
proceedings or during the course of the trial and can generally be remedied
by the court ordering disclosure, granting a continuance, or excluding
evidence related to the discovery violation. 94 More severe sanctions are
imposed, however, when discoverable evidence has been intentionally
destroyed, albeit in good faith. As courts and commentators have noted,
when evidence has been intentionally destroyed, it is usually difficult-if
not impossible-for the court to ascertain the import of the evidence, and
"[o]rdinarily, the only remedies available are dismissal of the prosecution
or, if the nondisclosed evidence would have been relevant only to challenge
particular evidence of the prosecution, exclusion of that evidence. '95 For
intentional destruction, courts have found that the defense need only show
that the undisclosed evidence was material to a determination of guilt or
innocence, and then the burden shifts to the government to show that the
defense has suffered no prejudice. 96 If the government is unable to meet its
burden, sanctions are normally imposed.
97
(holding that the government's noncompliance with pretrial disclosure of the defendant's
statement was prejudicial and warranted reversal of the conviction and a new trial); United
States v. Sawyer, 831 F. Supp. 755, 758 (D. Neb. 1993) (declaring a mistrial to remedy a
discovery violation). See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 957-58.
91. E.g., People v. Kelly, 467 N.E.2d 498, 501 (N.Y. 1984) (finding dismissal to be an
abuse of discretion where adverse inference instruction would have adequately cured
prejudice caused by government's destruction of evidence in violation of preservation
requirement).
92. E.g., People v. Howard, 469 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Crim. Ct. 1983) (sanction of
dismissal imposed where return of critical evidence to owner prior to trial violated
defendant's right to discovery); People v. Davis, 439 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799-800 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1981) (finding that dismissal did not amount to an abuse of judicial discretion
where prosecution failed to preserve critical evidence); People v. Churba, 353 N.Y.S.2d 130,
133-34 (Crim. Ct. 1974) (finding that the government's loss of critical evidence warranted
dismissal of criminal charges in the interests of justice where procedures employed to
preserve evidence were "haphazard and careless").
93. E.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that no discovery sanctions were warranted where defendant was not prejudiced by the
government's destruction of electronic recordings made by an informant).
94. E.g., United States v. Muessig, 427 F.3d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing
exclusionary sanction where government failed to disclose document during pretrial
discovery); People v. Johns, 784 N.E.2d 362, 366-67 (I11. App. Ct. 2002) (excluding
testimony relating to undisclosed videotape destroyed by the government despite defendant's
previous discovery request); Mahrdt v. State, 629 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(applying exclusion as sanction for intentional good' faith destruction of breathalyzer
evidence); see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 958-61.
95. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 962.
96. E.g., State v. Benton, 737 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that
the burden shifts to the government to show destroyed evidence was not exculpatory once
the defendant demonstrated that no substitute evidence was available).
97. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 109-10
(3d ed. 1996) (stating that imposing discovery sanctions is "essential to ensure that parties
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Prior to imposing sanctions, the trial court is expected to conduct a
hearing and make findings on the facts and circumstances surrounding
noncompliance with discovery.98 Following the factual inquiry, the trial
court has broad discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be
imposed to remedy the discovery violation. Consistent with the analytical
framework set forth in Bryant, in deciding whether to impose sanctions, the
trial court should balance (1) the government's stated reasons for
nondisclosure; (2) the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the defendant; (3)
the feasibility of rectifying the prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4)
any other relevant factors. 99
B. The Jencks Act
Another arm of the access to evidence doctrine is the Jencks Act, enacted
by Congress in 1957100 in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Jencks v. United States.10 l The Jencks Act requires the government to
disclose prior statements of a government witness after the witness testifies
and attorneys understand that these standards impose mandatory obligations, the breach of
which may bring serious consequences").
98. United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1993) (criticizing trial court's
resolution of discovery violation and stating that the trial court "failed to make even a
threshold inquiry into the circumstances leading to nondisclosure of the statement" and that
"[the court neither heard evidence nor made factual findings concerning the potential
prejudice flowing from a discovery violation"); Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d 35, 44 (Alaska
1980) (remanding the case for a hearing by the trial court on facts and circumstances
surrounding destruction of evidence).
99. See WRIGHT EL AL., supra note 81, at 185, 193.
100. See Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (2006)). 18 U.S.C. § 3500 provides, in relevant part,
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the
entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for
his examination and use.
(e) The term "statement". . . means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a ...recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded
contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement.., made by said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3500.
101. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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at a criminal trial. 10 2 A pretrial witness statement is a discoverable "Jencks
statement" if the statement is written or adopted by the witness, or is a
"substantially verbatim" account prepared by a third party that relates to the
witness's testimony. 103 Commonly, Jencks statements include grand jury
testimony, 10 4 statements handwritten by a witness, 105 and interview notes
written by prosecutors and law enforcement officers that constitute a
"substantially verbatim" account of an oral statement made by a witness. 106
The purpose of the disclosure of Jencks statements is to promote greater
fairness in the criminal justice system by enabling the defense to impeach
witnesses with prior inconsistent statements if testimony at trial differs from
any previous statement of the witness given to the government. 10 7 The
Court explained in Jencks, "Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer
knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness
recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory."' 0 8
In the years following passage of the Jencks statute, law enforcement
officers unfamiliar with the newly imposed preservation requirements
continued to follow long-standing agency practices of destroying original
witness statements and interview notes upon completion of official police
reports. 10 9 Moreover, although production of Jencks statements at trial
imposes an affirmative pretrial duty on prosecutors to identify and preserve
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. In 1980, the Jencks Act was incorporated into Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 26.2, which imposes a reciprocal requirement that the defense
disclose to the government the Jencks statements of defense witnesses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2
advisory committee's note. Disclosure of prior statements of a testifying witness is also
required pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure in various states. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.060 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-
1, Rules 613 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2612-2613 (West 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), (e)(l) (defining a statement as one in which the witness
adopted or approved as his own).
104. See id. § 3500(e)(3).
105. See id. § 3500(e)(1).
106. See id. § 3500(e)(2).
107. See United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957); see also Campbell v.
United States (Campbell 11), 373 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) (noting that the Jencks Act was
enacted to secure "fairness in federal criminal procedure"); Campbell v. United States
(Campbell 1), 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961) (stating that "[t]he command of the statute is thus
designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice, a goal of which the
judiciary is the special guardian"); Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318, 329 (D.C.
2003) (explaining that the purpose of the Jencks Act, which was designed to "'safeguard the
fairness of criminal trials by providing defendants with appropriate tools for cross-
examination,"' is to test the accuracy of the witness's in-court testimony (quoting Davis v.
United States, 641 A.2d 484, 489 (D.C. 1994))).
108. See Jencks, 353 U.S. at 667.
109. E.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 921 (4th Cir. 1980)
(discussing reports prepared by witnesses and destroyed by the government "according to
routine CIA procedures"); United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that testimony by a DEA agent that his "regular practice" of destroying witness
interview notes "was in conformance with the regular practice of the agency at the time");
United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1976) (criticizing the "routine" FBI
practice of officers destroying notes made during witness interviews).
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Jencks statements, prosecutors did not aggressively perform this discovery
function." l0  As a result, discoverable Jencks statements were either
belatedly produced during trial or it was disclosed at trial that a previously
existing Jencks statement had been destroyed."Il
One of the main tools available to courts to enforce the disclosure and
preservation duties is section (d) of the Jencks statute, which grants courts
the authority to strike testimony or declare a mistrial if the government
"elects not to comply" with the disclosure requirements. 112 In many cases,
the imposition of either of these sanctions would seriously impair the
government's ability to prosecute or effectively bar prosecution. As a
result, despite the mandatory language in section (d), the proscribed Jencks
sanctions have been limited by the court to those rare cases in which the
government has made a conscious, intentional decision not to produce
witness statements. 113  The Jencks statute has been interpreted to give
courts broad discretion to determine whether any sanctions should be
imposed, and, if so, what sanction is appropriate and "consistent with the
fair administration of justice."' '4 If the government is able to belatedly
produce the Jencks statement during trial, the court can craft a remedy to
address the harm caused by the belated disclosure without striking
testimony or ordering a new trial. 1 5 Thus, in the overwhelming majority of
110. See supra note 109.
111. See supra note 109.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) provides,
If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under
subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its
discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be
declared.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (2006).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the court is restricted to "harsh remedies" of section (d) of the Jencks Act only when the
government intentionally ignores the disclosure requirements of the Jencks Act). But see
United States v. Reyes, 510 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D. Ariz. 1981) (concluding that the court can
impose Jencks Act sanctions whether or not government's noncompliance was intentional).
114. See, e.g., Taylor, 13 F.3d at 990 (stating that the court is "entitled to craft and apply
a remedy that would best serve the interests of justice"); Gantt, 617 F.2d at 841-42 (holding
that sanctions for Jencks Act violations are not automatic).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 445-48 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to impose Jencks sanctions
where the government belatedly produced Jencks material); United States v. Peterson, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that suppression of a Jencks statement
by the government was inadvertent and the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the
Jencks statements contained major discrepancies with the witness's trial testimony and were
not turned over to the defense until the conclusion of trial); United States v. Mannarino, 850
F. Supp. 57, 73 (D. Mass. 1994) (ordering a new trial with pretrial depositions of
government witnesses because the destruction of a confidential informant's handwritten
narrative of his criminal history violated the Jencks Act); Reyes, 510 F. Supp. at 153-54
(ordering a new trial where "such a strong impression has been made on the minds of the
jury by illegal and improper testimony that its subsequent withdrawal will not remove the
effect caused by its admission").
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cases, the section (d) sanctions are not imposed if nondisclosure is due to
negligence or inadvertence, 116 if there is no bad faith on the part of the
government, 17 or if there is no prejudice to the defendant. Courts are more
willing to strike testimony or declare a mistrial to sanction the government
when Jencks material has been intentionally destroyed."l 8 Courts have
explained that intentional destruction robs the trial judge of the ability to
discern the import of the destroyed statement and access the amount of
prejudice to the defense, and that it is antithetical to the purpose of the
Jencks disclosure requirements."19 Therefore, when the government is
responsible for the intentional destruction of Jencks material, the
government bears the "heavy burden" of explaining the loss and must be
able to demonstrate that it has made earnest efforts to preserve crucial
materials and that there is no resulting prejudice to the defense. 120
Moreover, most courts have held that while good faith is relevant to the
imposition of sanctions when the government unintentionally destroys
Jencks material, there is no good faith exception for the intentional
destruction of Jencks statements. 121 Good or bad faith is only relevant, if at
116. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 66 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the
trial court did not err in refusing to impose sanctions where Jencks statements were
inadvertently lost). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness
Statements: Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 651, 661-66 (1999)
(discussing the federal courts' use of sanctioning authority under the Jencks Act).
117. See, e.g., Taylor, 13 F.3d at 990 (stating that, "[w]hen there is no bad faith or motive
to suppress, and when any prejudice is curable at trial, the government has not 'elected not to
comply' and subsection (d) does not control").
118. See United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (declaring that there
will be sanctions when the destruction of a Jencks statement is deliberate); United States v.
Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1324 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (listing sanctions, including the exclusion
or suppression of other evidence concerning the subject matter of the undisclosed material,
the grant of a new trial, or, in exceptional circumstances, dismissal of the indictment or the
direction of a judgment of acquittal); see also United States v. Tincher, Nos. 90-063, 90-
4107, 90-4108, 90-4109, 1991 WL 175282, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1991) (finding that the
prosecutor's "deliberate misrepresentations" regarding the existence of grand jury testimony
constituted an intentional violation of the Jencks Act and directing the trial court to strike the
witness's testimony and enter a judgment of acquittal if the remaining evidence was
insufficient to support conviction); United States v. Well, 572 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (striking the testimony of witnesses where tape-recorded witness
interviews were erased by a government agent after the interviews were summarized in case
memoranda).
119. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 962.
120. See United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 377-78 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding
reversible error where trial court refused to strike testimony of key government informant
after DEA agent intentionally shredded informant's Jencks statement).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing the
lower court's denial of sanctions where the government intentionally destroyed the Jencks
statement of a "key" government witness/informant); Bufalino, 576 F.2d at 449 (stating that,
"[w]here, as here, destruction is deliberate, sanctions will normally follow, irrespective of
the perpetrator's motivation"); Carrasco, 537 F.2d at 376 (rejecting the argument that the
DEA standard operating procedure mandating destruction of a document shielded the
government from Jencks sanctions because the DEA agent acted in good faith); United
States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 71-72 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating that "establishing the
'good faith' of violations of Jencks Act obligations-while perhaps relevant to fashioning
the appropriate remedy-is not sufficient to insulate the government from sanction for an
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all, to the severity of the sanction to be imposed. Thus, in order to
determine the appropriate sanction for intentional destruction of evidence,
courts are first required to conduct a hearing to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the loss/destruction of evidence. 122 Thereafter,
in deciding what sanction should be imposed, trial courts weigh and
evaluate (1) the circumstances surrounding the destruction and the degree of
bad faith; (2) the prejudice to the defendant or the importance of the
evidence lost; and (3) the strength of the evidence of guilt adduced at
trial. 123
C. The Brady Doctrine
The third provision of the access to evidence doctrine originates in the
Supreme Court's landmark holding in Brady. In Brady, the Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."' 124 The Brady doctrine applies to evidence that completely or
partially absolves the defendant of criminal responsibility, information that
relates to impeachment of government witnesses, and evidence that could
favorably affect the sentence imposed on the defendant.' 25 To establish a
due process violation based on nondisclosure of Brady material, the burden
is on the defense to show that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2)
the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the defense was
prejudiced by the nondisclosure because the suppressed evidence was
material.' 26 The Supreme Court has held that in order to establish that
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence was material, the defense must
demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability" that had the suppressed
evidence been disclosed to the defendant, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. 127 The linchpin of this inquiry is whether suppression
of the evidence denied the defendant a fair trial and undermined confidence
in the verdict.1 2
8
As with other access to evidence provisions, the Brady doctrine is based
on the practical recognition that there is a gross disparity of investigative
established statutory violation" (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908,
921 (4th Cir. 1980); Carrasaco, 537 F.2d at 376)).
122. See United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 447 (7th Cir. 1984) (inquiring into the
circumstances surrounding the government's nonproduction of a Jencks statement and
finding that such an inquiry is critical to determining whether the government has "flouted
the purpose of the Jencks Act"); United States v. Johnson, 521 F.2d 1318, 1319-20 (9th Cir.
1975) (noting that the trial court has the duty to inquire into the circumstances surrounding
nondisclosure in order to determine the appropriate sanction to redress the violation).
123. See Riley, 189 F.3d at 806-07.
124. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
125. Id.; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 1114-15.
126. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 685,
694 (2006).
127. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 668 (1985).
128. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
2913
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
resources and access to information between the defense and the
prosecution in our criminal justice system. 129  The Brady disclosure
requirements are necessary to compensate for some of those imbalances and
"ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur" simply because the
defense was unaware of material exculpatory information in the possession
of the government.130 As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted,
One of the most basic elements of fairness in a criminal trial is that
available evidence tending to show innocence, as well as that tending to
show guilt, be fully aired before the jury .... [T]he prosecutor fulfills his
most basic responsibility when he fully airs all the relevant evidence at his
command."' 31
The prosecutor plays a very expansive role in determining whether
evidence falls within the scope of Brady and, if so, when the evidence will
be disclosed to the defense.132 Brady does not mandate pretrial disclosure
as long as the information is disclosed "in time for its 'effective' use at
trial."' 133 This broad prosecutorial authority carries with it a concomitant
affirmative duty to investigate. 134  It is now well-established that the
government's disclosure duty extends beyond evidence the prosecutor
physically possesses and beyond evidence of which the prosecutor is
personally aware. 135  The prosecutor is charged with constructive
knowledge of information collected by all those acting on behalf of the
government.136 Moreover, nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence
violates Brady even if the prosecutor has acted negligently or inadvertently
and not in bad faith in suppressing the evidence. 137 The Court has stated
that "[i]f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is
because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
129. Id. at 437-38.
130. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
131. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that "[t]he original
'access to evidence' right in Brady derived from the Court's recognition that defendants
possess a substantial interest in obtaining favorable evidence, which outweighs the minimal
adverse impact on prosecutors").
132. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (Stevens, J.) (noting that if evidence clearly supports a claim
of innocence, the prosecutor's duty to disclose the evidence should "equally arise even if no
request is made" by defense counsel).
133. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the government's
disclosure of evidence on the eve of trial was "too little, too late" and amounted to
suppression of the evidence); United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citing United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Higgs,
713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983)) (finding that there is no constitutional violation if the
defendant "is given impeachment material, even exculpatory impeachment material, in time
for use at trial").
134. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (stating that prosecutors have a responsibility to "gauge the
likely net effect" of all evidence and "make [a] disclosure when the point of 'reasonable
probability' is reached").
135. Id. at 437-38.
136. Id. at 437.
137. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
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prosecutor."' 38 The Court has recognized that the Brady doctrine places the
prosecutor in the dual (and conflicting) role of being both an advocate on
behalf of the government as well as a guardian of justice responsible for
protecting the truth-seeking function of the trial process by disclosing
information which helps the defense and undermines the government's
case.139 The Court, however, reconciles this conflict with its command that
prosecutors seek justice and not just convictions. 140 In the more than four
decades since the Court's landmark ruling, legal scholars have recognized
that the implementation of Brady has been uneven at best and a complete
failure at worst.141 Nonetheless, Brady remains a critical avenue for the
defense to gain access to evidence that is in the possession of the
government and not otherwise discoverable pursuant to other access to
evidence provisions.
While the prosecutor retains discretion over the disclosure of Brady
evidence, if the court finds that material, exculpatory evidence has been
suppressed or destroyed, the court has broad discretion to impose sanctions
on the government to remedy the violation. There is no automatic dismissal
for a Brady violation.142 Also, a court has much greater latitude in
fashioning a remedy when Brady violations are discovered prior to trial or
during trial. 143 However, a posttrial finding that the government suppressed
138. Id.
139. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the interest of a U.S.
Attorney is not to win a case, but to see "that justice shall be done"); see also Janet C.
Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109
PENN ST. L. REv. 1133, 1140-41 (2005) (arguing that it is perhaps unrealistic to expect
prosecutors to be both zealous advocates in an intensely adversarial criminal justice system
and to "do justice" by turning over exculpatory information in their possession).
140. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
141. E.g., Gershman, supra note 126, at 687-90 ("Brady has failed as a discovery
doctrine. Brady is insufficiently enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually
unenforceable when violations are hidden." (citing Scott F. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 643, 645
(2002))); Hoeffel, supra note 139, at 1148 (stating that "[w]ithholding favorable evidence,
however, seems to be the norm" and discussing the nationwide epidemic of Brady violations
by prosecutors, including the large number of homicide convictions and wrongful
convictions caused by nondisclosure of exculpatory information or knowing presentation of
false testimony); Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field, Part III or What's on the
Discovery Channel, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 67, 68 (2003) (noting that, "[s]ince courts rarely
admonish prosecutors, dismiss cases, or make referrals to grievance committees for non-
disclosure, the penalty for prosecutors for nondisclosure, aside from convicting the innocent,
or at least those who might be found not guilty, is de minimis"); Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 693, 703-08 (1987) (asserting that prosecutors are rarely held accountable for Brady
violations and rarely will courts reverse a conviction based on Brady violations); Joseph R.
Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 833 passim (1997) (discussing
the persistence of prosecutorial misconduct and withholding of exculpatory evidence despite
case law requiring disclosure of such evidence).
142. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (noting that the prosecution's
failure to disclose Brady information does not automatically require a new trial).
143. E.g., People v. Campos, 722 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that,
although the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory statements made by a prosecution
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material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady means the defendant
was denied the due process right to a fair trial and the conviction cannot
stand. 144 The usual remedy will, therefore, be to reverse the conviction and
order a new trial, 145 or, in more extreme circumstances, to dismiss the
charges (vacate the conviction). 1
46
In determining what sanction is appropriate, the trial court must conduct
a hearing to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the violation, and
the sanction imposed must be the least restrictive sanction to redress the
violation and protect the rights of the defendant to a fair trial. 147 The trial
court should also consider (1) the strength of the government's case; (2) the
prejudice to the defense; and (3) the degree of negligence or bad faith on the
witness, instructions to the jury to disregard the testimony of this witness in its entirety cured
any potential prejudice to the defendant); People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158, 164 (Sup.
Ct. 1995) (allowing witness statements to be introduced at trial and giving the jury an
adverse inference instruction on the Brady violation, where nondisclosure of inconsistent
pretrial statements of a key government witness was discovered pretrial).
144. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
145. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting new trials based on the government's failure to
reveal to the defense drug use and drug dealings by prisoner witnesses or the unusual favors
that the government granted those witnesses); see, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp.
2d 1231, 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (explaining that the usual remedy for a Brady violation is a
new trial); People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 54 (Colo. 1985); People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d
470, 474 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Springer, 504 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (App. Div.
1986); People v. Saddy, 445 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (App. Div. 1981); State v. Roughton, 724
N.E.2d 1193, 1217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
146. See United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1248-49 (11 th Cir. 2003) (noting that it
is within a district court's inherent power to dismiss an indictment on grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct); Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (finding that the prejudice caused
by the government's numerous and flagrant Brady violations warranted dismissal, with
prejudice, of the drug conspiracy count as well as the remaining counts of a multicount
indictment); Sheppard, 701 P.2d at 54 (finding that the failure of the prosecution to prevent
the destruction of the automobile in a vehicular homicide case not only left the defendant
"without physical evidence of the cause of the accident, but also removed the opportunity for
the defense's expert to examine the car," and thus dismissal of the case was appropriate);
Harmes, 560 P.2d at 472-74 (dismissing the charge of second degree assault where the
police negligently destroyed a videotape of the altercation between the defendant and the
police that formed the basis of the charge); Springer, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35 (holding that
police destruction of surveillance photographs requires the reversal of a robbery conviction);
Saddy, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 603-05 (reversing two convictions for criminal sale of a controlled
substance because law enforcement officials, claiming reasons of economy, erased a series
of tape recordings relating to the defendant's defense); Roughton, 724 N.E.2d at 1217
(concluding that the state's failure to turn genetic evidence over to the defendant undermined
confidence in the outcome of the trial and thus required reversal).
147. See United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an
evidentiary hearing on a claim of a Brady violation was warranted, as "'resolution of this
matter is best served by the light of a hearing, not the darkness of an assumption on appeal'
(quoting United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993))); Perdomo v.
State, 565 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, if the state fails to
provide defense counsel with requested evidence on discovery, and the failure is brought to
the trial court's attention, a hearing must be held to inquire into the potential discovery
violation); People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 336 (I11. 1998) (holding that the defendant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on postconviction claims that the government's bad faith
destruction of Brady evidence constituted a denial of due process).
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part of the government. 148 While bad faith is required to find a Brady
violation, the egregiousness or degree of fault of the government in causing
the suppression of exculpatory information is directly relevant to the
severity of the sanction to be imposed. 149 Courts have recognized that
sanctions can be imposed to deter misconduct on behalf of the police and
prosecutors. 150
II. FROM ACCESS TO EVIDENCE TO INNOCENCE PROTECTION
The evidence preservation and disclosure requirements imposed on the
government by innocence protection laws fall squarely within the scope of
the access to evidence doctrine. Innocence protection laws add biological
material to the list of evidence already subject to disclosure by the
government under Rule 16, the Jencks Act, and the Brady doctrine.
Moreover, while other access to evidence provisions mandate disclosure of
evidence during trial or pretrial, innocence protection laws extend the
government's discovery obligations to the postconviction stage. As with
the other disclosure provisions, these remedial statutes are designed to
ensure that the defense has equal access to information to correct any
imbalance of resources between the defense and prosecution, and to
promote greater fairness in criminal proceedings. Thus, the wrongful
destruction of biological evidence needed for postconviction DNA testing is
as much an affront to the integrity of the judicial process as other access to
evidence violations. Accordingly, the well-worn, flexible analysis
developed by courts to adjudicate other evidence destruction violations
should be used by courts when adjudicating violations of innocence
protection laws. Specifically, when DNA evidence has been wrongly
destroyed, courts should take into account (1) the circumstances
surrounding the loss or destruction of evidence (or the degree of
government culpability); (2) the prejudice to the defense (or the importance
148. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 960-63.
149. See Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (holding that, because "[t]he Government's
protracted course of misconduct caused extraordinary prejudice to Lyons, exhibited
disregard of the Government's duties, and demonstrated contempt for this Court," it is only
appropriate to dismiss the remaining counts, as a new trial would be an insufficient remedy);
Sheppard, 701 P.2d at 54-55 (stating that the prosecution's conduct may be taken into
account when determining an appropriate remedy for the destruction of evidence); People v.
Sams, 685 P.2d 157, 163 (Colo. 1984) (holding that in determining sanctions the degree of
governmental culpability in causing the loss or destruction of evidence is an appropriate
consideration); Springer, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (noting that the loss of surveillance
photographs was not the result of negligence or oversight, but rather they were deliberately
discarded by a police detective based solely on his judgment that they were not useful, and
thus the defendant's conviction should be overturned); Saddy, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (taking
into account the fact that it was the deliberate actions of law enforcement officials, although
not necessarily in bad faith, that resulted in the destruction of evidence in deciding what
sanction is appropriate).
150. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Colo. 1983)
(stating that the sanction imposed for the destruction of evidence should serve "the dual
purposes of protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process and deterring the prosecutor
and the police from destroying material evidence").
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of the evidence); and (3) the strength of the government's evidence of guilt
adduced at trial.
A. Circumstances Surrounding the Destruction of Evidence
The first prong of the access to evidence sanctions analysis focuses on
the facts and circumstances that caused the destruction of evidence and the
extent to which the government was at fault. One preliminary issue that
frequently arises in postconviction litigation under innocence protection
statutes is whether the biological evidence needed for DNA testing has
actually been destroyed or whether it is simply lost in an overcrowded,
mismanaged property room. Because most petitions for postconviction
DNA testing are filed many years after the original criminal
investigation,151 the government frequently moves to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that all testable evidence was lawfully destroyed long before
the innocence protection law mandated preservation.1 52 Some courts have
simply accepted the government's perfunctory response and granted
dismissal without a hearing or further inquiry. 153 Increasingly, however,
before petitions for postconviction testing are dismissed, courts have placed
the burden on the government to prove that all testable evidence has, in fact,
been destroyed. 154
151. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 119 (2008) (finding
that, on average, among the first 200 people exonerated with DNA testing, the prisoner
served an average of twelve years before being exonerated); see also Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523,
535 (2005) (finding an average span of more than eleven years between the date of
conviction and the date of exoneration in a study of all reported exonerations between 1989
and 2003).
152. See, e.g., Arey v. State, 929 A.2d 501 (Md. 2007); Blake v. State, 909 A.2d 1020
(Md. 2005).
153. E.g., State v. Crawford, Nos. CR.A.IN88-02-1007R2, CR.A.1N88-02-1008,
CR.A.IN88-04-0845R2, 2005 WL 2841652, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2005) (stating
that the decision to hold an evidence destruction hearing to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding destruction is within the discretion of the trial court).
154. E.g., Tyler v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696, 701 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the evidentiary
hearing on existence of biological evidence for DNA testing was sufficient where court
"received live testimony and deposition transcripts from a variety of individuals involved in
the retention and movement of evidence ... as well as various exhibits," and concluding that
biological evidence no longer existed and could not be subjected to DNA testing); Carter v.
State, 913 So. 2d 701, 702-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he record does not contain any
documentary or testimonial evidence to support the state's assertions that there is no
evidence to test or that the blood on the shirt belonged to the victim. We therefore reverse
and remand for an evidentiary hearing...."); People v. Pitts, 828 N.E.2d 67, 72 (N.Y. 2005)
("[T]he People, and not defendant, had the burden of establishing with sufficient specificity
whether the evidence existed and could be tested. The mere assertion that the evidence no
longer exists based on a phone call to a police Property Clerk's office is insufficient as a
matter of law .. "). In People v. Pitts, the court then remanded the case with specific
directions:
[The] Supreme Court should take steps to obtain from the People reliable
information as to whether or not the evidence sought exists and the source of such
information. Adequate information from the People might include, for example,
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Maryland courts have recently articulated the scope of the government's
due diligence obligation to thoroughly search for testable biological
evidence. In Blake v. State,155 the Maryland Court of Appeals found that
before a petition for testing can be denied on the grounds that the evidence
no longer exists, the government, as the custodian of the evidence, bears the
burden of proving the evidence has been destroyed. 156 The court held that
the government cannot meet this burden with an "unsworn, unverified
memorandum" stating that the police department's evidence storage facility
was searched and the evidence was not found. 157 Later, in Arey v. State,158
the court found that even a sworn affidavit stating that the police
department evidence database was checked and the evidence could not be
located was insufficient to meet the government's burden. 159 The court
explained in great detail that the government is required to perform a
thorough and exhaustive search for the evidence throughout the criminal
justice system in each place where the evidence could have been stored.
160
The court also mandated that the government identify the protocols that
were in place for destruction of evidence at each location to determine
whether proper procedures were followed in destroying the evidence and
whether the destruction was documented. 161 The court concluded that
"[o]nce the State performs a reasonable search and demonstrates
sufficiently a prima facie case, either directly or circumstantially, that the
requested evidence no longer exists, the State will have satisfied its burden
of persuasion."
62
After the trial court is sufficiently satisfied that all testable biological
evidence has been destroyed, the court should then determine whether the
evidence was destroyed after preservation was mandated by the innocence
protection statute. 163 If so, the court should conduct the requisite fact-
finding hearing to determine what steps, if any, the government took to
an affidavit from an individual with direct knowledge of the status of the evidence
or an official record indicating its existence or nonexistence.
Pitts, 828 N.E.2d at 72.
155. 909 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2006).
156. Id. at 1031 ("It is only logical that this burden is upon the State, as the State gathered
the evidence and was the custodian of the evidence. The information as to the location of the
evidence and the manner of its destruction would not be within the knowledge of an
inmate.").
157. Id.
158. 929 A.2d 501 (Md. 2007).
159. Id. at 506, 508.
160. Id. at 508 ("[T]he State needs to check any place the evidence could reasonably be
found, unless there is a written record that the evidence had been destroyed in accordance
with then existing protocol."). The court stated that this search should include the judge's
chambers, court clerk's office, police departments, prosecutor's offices, hospitals,
courthouse property rooms, and both state crime labs and independent forensic testing labs
that might have been used by the government at the time the case was originally prosecuted.
Id. at 508-09.
161. Id. at 508.




prevent destruction, or what actions of the government contributed to the
destruction of the evidence.164
In deciding whether the facts surrounding the destruction of evidence
support the imposition of sanctions, courts have been more forgiving when
the discovery violation was caused by an inadvertent error by an evidence
custodian or an isolated act of negligence by a property clerk who, in "good
faith," destroyed evidence as part of the routine housekeeping of the
property storage facility. 165  Conversely, courts have found the
government's actions are subject to sanctions when the circumstances
surrounding the destruction of evidence suggest bad faith,' 66 a flagrant
pattern of noncompliance with mandated disclosure duties, 167 or a failure to
take necessary steps to ensure that evidence is properly preserved. 168
In United States v. Mannarino,169 the court found that a police officer's
destruction of a handwritten statement made by a key government witness
was a Jencks violation, even though the officer testified that he was
unaware of the disclosure requirements imposed by the Jencks Act and had
incorporated the substance of the witness statement into his police report. 170
The court held the government responsible for the nondisclosure and stated,
The government's calculated decision to leave the preservation of
materials whose disclosure was plainly required to a person unprepared
by disposition or training to perform that function cannot be dismissed as
mere negligence. It represents a knowing failure to do what the law
164. Id. (noting the inherent power of the court to conduct evidentiary hearing and
collecting authorities); see also Tyler v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 2005)
(summarizing the court's prior en banc decision in a case directing the lower court "to order
the evidence tested" if it still exists, and "to enter findings regarding the circumstances ... of
destruction" if the court finds that the evidence no longer exists).
165. See Tyler, 413 F.3d at 702 (noting that there was evidence of possible "negligence or
lax record keeping" but no facts tending to suggest "the intentional destruction of the
disputed evidence").
166. United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 72 (D. Mass. 1994).
167. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 114 ("[Wlhere a
pattern emerges of discovery violations... court[s] should also consider the need to impose
sanctions that will deter future violations."); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 20.6(b), at 503 & n.42 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining that discovery violations that
reflect a pattern of or recurring disregard for sanctions can support a finding of bad faith);
see also United States v. Davis, 244 F.3d 666, 672-73 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district
court's exclusion of DNA evidence when the government failed to comply with a discovery
order); People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298, 1300 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (affirming the
suppression of evidence related to a piece of biological evidence that was destroyed because
of police "gross negligence and misfeasance"); Mathis v. State, 819 P.2d 1302, 1306 (N.M.
1991) (finding a sanction of dismissal appropriate when the government's purposely
"engag[ing] in a pattern of evasion" in not complying with its disclosure amounted to bad
faith); State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, 454 S.E.2d 427, 438 (W. Va. 1994) (upholding a sanction
of dismissal based on pattern of noncompliance with court-ordered discovery because that
noncompliance was disruptive to the efficient administration of justice).
168. United States v. Bryant (Bryant 1), 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 448 F.2d
1182 (D.C. Cir. 197 1) (per curiam).
169. 850 F. Supp. 57.
170. Id. at 64, 71.
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requires .... [I]t does not require any strain to find that the disclosure
responsibilities were not undertaken in good faith. 
171
Citing a repeated pattern of discovery violations spanning over a decade,
the court expressed frustration with the government's "sustained and
obdurate indifference" to its discovery obligations. 172 The court concluded
that
it is an imperative duty on the part of government counsel to assure all
involved in the disclosure chain are aware of their responsibilities. . . . If
anything other than intentional flouting of a court order or a statutory
command can be found to be bad faith, it is the unpoliced delegation of
preservation and disclosure responsibilities to the unwilling and, perhaps,
unknowing.
173
When the Bryant court likewise found a persistent pattern of destruction
of discoverable evidence, rather than simply impose sanctions on the
government for the individual violation in the case, the court took broad
steps to impose systemic reforms in the government's evidence
management practices. The court stated,
sanctions for non-disclosure based on loss of evidence will be invoked in
the future unless the Government can show that it has promulgated,
enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous and systematic
procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the
course of the criminal investigation.... Negligent failure to comply with
the required procedures will provide no excuse. Although we leave it up
to the various investigative agencies to draft rules suited to their own
method of operation, all such rules will be subject to review of their
adequacy to the assigned task.
174
171. Id. at 71.
172. Id. at 59; see also Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2005)
(asserting that a pattern of recurring violations might warrant sanction of dismissal to deter
further violations where misconduct is not an isolated incident); Virgin Islands v. Testamark,
570 F.2d 1162, 1168 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that, with no "continuing course of errant
conduct which might call for prophylactic sanctions," no sanctions were warranted); LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 167, § 20.6(b), at 508-09.
173. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. at 72; see id. at 71 (citing United States v. Kincaid, 712
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that no one in the prosecutor's office "took the steps
necessary to preserve" evidence); United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 413 (1st Cir.
1986) (finding that prosecutors repeatedly engaged in "sloppy" practices with respect to
disclosure of discoverable materials)).
174. United States v. Bryant (Bryant 1), 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 448 F.2d
1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam); see also People v. Churba, 353 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133-34
(Crim. Ct. 1974) (granting a dismissal upon finding that "[t]he cumulative effect of the poor
investigation and the ultimate loss of the evidence can only result in an irreparable denial of
this defendant's right to adequately prepare for and maintain his own defense" where
procedures employed to preserve evidence were "at best, haphazard and careless and, at
worst, grossly negligent" and the loss of the evidence as a direct result of the prosecution's
failure to adequately safeguard it placed the defendant "in an inferior position in presenting
his defense, through no fault of his own").
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The court reasoned that "[b]y requiring . . . regular procedures for
preserving evidence, we intend to ensure that rights recognized at one stage
of the criminal process will not be undercut at other, less visible, stages."
175
Applying these standards to innocence protection laws, at a time when
the use of biological evidence is now firmly established in the culture of our
criminal justice system and innocence protection laws have been enacted in
nearly every jurisdiction in the country, the continued "routine" destruction
of biological evidence cannot be dismissed by courts as a simple act of "bad
judgment." Sanctions should be imposed where the government is fully
aware of the rampant evidence mismanagement in the jurisdiction. There
have been numerous cases where evidence needed for pending pretrial cases
and postconviction cases is routinely lost,176 prematurely destroyed, 177 or
dangerously at risk for contamination based on the substandard conditions
in the evidence storage facility. 178 Similarly, when evidence handlers are
vested with the discretionary authority to destroy evidence, as in Lovitt,
there should be greater government culpability when the prosecutor's office
fails to train evidence handlers on the postconviction evidence preservation
requirements mandated by innocence protection laws. A court could find
that the government's knowledge of the poor state of evidence
management, coupled with the government's failure to put in place
175. Bryant I, 439 F.2d at 652.
176. See, Jones, supra note 18, at 1243 nn.20-21; Caren Burmeister, Lawyer Says
Evidence Lost in Murder Case, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 31, 2002, at L-1, available at
http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/083102/nes_10315305.shtml (reporting that
key murder scene DNA evidence is missing); Chris Dettro, Missing DNA Leads to Acquittal
in Battery, Home Invasion Case, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, I11.), Apr. 2, 2005, at 9 (stating that
a jury acquitted a man after the judge excluded DNA evidence because the accused's blood
sample and DNA extraction could not be located); Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Crime
Lab Evidence Missing in 21 Cases, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 2003, at A15 (reporting that
the Houston Police Department's crime lab is missing the physical evidence in at least
twenty-one cases); S. U. Mahesh, Santa Fe Police Can't Find Evidence, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Apr. 26, 2000, at C3 (reporting that an internal audit of the Santa Fe Police Department's
evidence room shows that over 1300 pieces of evidence are missing from an unknown
number of cases).
177. Jones, supra note 18, at 1243; see also Moffeit & Greene, supra note 31 (reporting
that over the past decade 5515 rape evidence kits have been lost or destroyed).
178. See, e.g., CHARLES J. WILLOUGHBY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., GOV'T OF D.C.,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OBSERVATIONS AT THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S EVIDENCE CONTROL BRANCH 2-4 (2008), available at
http://oig.dc.gov/news/view2.asp?url-release07%2F0 10408_1 .pdf&mode=audit&archived=
0&month=20080. According to the audit of the District of Columbia evidence storage
facility,
the facility disclosed problems such as an inadequate heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) system, a poor electrical system, leaky pipes and roof,
severe overcrowding in storage areas, and poor physical security .... These
facility-related conditions increase the risk of theft, misuse, or loss of evidence,
which may compromise the District's ability to successfully prosecute criminal
cases, thereby hindering the ECB's [Evidence Control Branch's] mission.
Id. at i. Further, "[b]iological materials ... should be stored in a climate-controlled and
moisture-free environment to properly preserve evidence. However, we found that
biological materials stored in the warehouse are subject to extreme temperatures and
humidity levels." Id. at 4.
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adequate safeguards to ensure that evidence would be properly preserved,
amounts to a reckless disregard of discovery obligations and supports the
imposition of sanctions.
Moreover, despite calls for comprehensive regulation and training for
evidence handlers, few jurisdictions have undertaken this critical reform to
prevent the loss and destruction of biological evidence. 179 While federal
regulations were promulgated to implement the evidence preservation
requirement of the federal innocence protection statute, 180 few states have
adopted evidence preservation regulations to ensure proper preservation of
biological evidence needed for postconviction DNA testing.181
Passage of evidence management regulations and procedures in some
jurisdictions should give courts greater latitude to demand reform of
evidence management practices throughout the criminal justice system. In
fact, despite criticism by legal scholars regarding the Bryant court's purely
179. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING:
A POLICY REVIEW 22-23 (2008), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-
contentluploads/post-convictiondna-fin.pdf (proposing the creation of a state-wide task force
to create standards for the proper preservation of evidence, training for property clerks on
retention of biological evidence, and a centralized tracking system for efficient retrieval of
old evidence); see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, MODEL LEGISLATION, 2008 STATE
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS: AN ACT TO IMPROVE THE PRESERVATION AND ACCESSIBILITY OF
BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE § 5(A)-(B) (2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/PreservationEvidencePrescriptive_.08.pdf (proposing standards for the proper
collection and retention of biological evidence and training programs for law enforcement
officers and other relevant employees charged with preservation of biological evidence).
180. The federal innocence protection statute mandated that the U.S. Auorney General
"promulgate regulations to implement" the preservation of biological evidence mandated by
the new law. Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600A(e) (2006); see 28 C.F.R. §§
28.23-28.26 (2008) (implementing the preservation of evidence provisions contained in the
Innocence Protection Act of 2004, a subset of the Justice for All Act of 2004). The Justice
for All Act of 2004, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 3600A, defines "biological evidence";
sets forth the length of time such evidence must be preserved; explains when destruction is
permitted and the procedures that must be followed prior to destruction; explains how to
extract biological samples of evidence from large, bulky pieces of evidence (like
automobiles) that cannot be retained; and explains the penalties for noncompliance,
including employee disciplinary sanctions and criminal penalties (felony offense punishable
by up to five years of imprisonment). 18 U.S.C. § 3600A.
18 1. Evidence preservation regulations have been developed for California, see OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF CAL., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING TASK FORCE REPORT
(n.d.), available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/finalproof.pdf (making recommendations on
how biological evidence should be preserved and stored and explaining the length of
retention mandated by the new law based in part on the "best practices among California law
enforcement for evidence handling and storage"), and a model evidence management reform
project was successfully implemented in Charlotte, North Carolina, see CHARLOTTE-
MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP'T, BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE CATALOGUE PROJECT (n.d.), available
at http://www.newenglandinnocence.org/site/content/documents/PreservationAccesslssues/
Catalogue%20Project.pdf (describing the Biological Evidence Catalogue Project, which,
among other things, made a complete inventory of all old biological evidence, and
explaining that the new reforms were implemented in part to comply with the new innocence
protection laws and to "bolster the integrity of the criminal discovery process"). In addition,
comprehensive reform proposals are being developed to reform evidence management




prospective remedy, 182 the court's actions successfully forced the
government to implement long overdue reforms of its evidence preservation
practices.183 Post-Bryant, law enforcement agencies adopted clear evidence
preservation regulations and the court imposed sanctions when evidence
was destroyed in violation of those procedures. 184 This approach was also
adopted by other jurisdictions and resulted in improved evidence
management practices. 1 85
In sum, once the court is satisfied that the evidence has been destroyed,
in examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the destruction, the
court should determine what steps, if any, were taken by the government to
ensure that biological evidence needed for DNA testing was properly
preserved. Specifically, the court should determine whether the
government ensured that evidence handlers were properly trained in
182. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 46, at 559-61 (noting that under the Bryant approach the
imposition of sanctions will depend largely on the conduct of the government agent
regardless of whether there is any prejudice to the defense, and that, alternatively, the court
could decline to impose sanctions for evidence destruction--even when the defense is
prejudiced-if the government agent fully adhered to the requisite preservation rules adopted
by the government agency); Comment, supra note 46, at 651-52 (criticizing the holding in
Bryant because it fails to address what an appropriate sanction might be for destruction of
evidence and because it does not fully address what courts should do when a government
agency adopts appropriate procedures but a government agent negligently fails to adhere to
those procedures and, as a result, evidence is lost).
183. United States v. Bryant (Bryant I1), 448 F.2d 1182, 1184 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(noting that, less than one month after the court issued its first opinion in Bryant, law
enforcement agencies instituted changes to reform evidence preservation procedures);
Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318, 330 n.14 (D.C. 2003) ("In direct response to
Bryant, the Metropolitan Police Department issued instructions to members of the
department on 'Preservation of Potentially Discoverable Material'....").
184. E.g., United States v. Arriola, Nos. 91-3329, 91-3336, 92-3006, 94-3103, 1994 WL
709343, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 23, 1994) (applying the Bryant test and striking testimony
related to destroyed Jencks statement).
185. In United States v. Bufalino, the court also confronted widespread, systemic
problems of destruction of Jencks material and sent a strong message to the government
regarding the standards the court would apply in future cases, stating,
[W]e will look with an exceedingly jaundiced eye upon future efforts to justify
non-production of a [statement] by reference to "department policy" or
"established practice" or anything of the like. There simply is no longer any
excuse for official ignorance regarding the mandate of the law. Where, as here,
destruction is deliberate, sanctions will normally follow, irrespective of the
perpetrator's motivation ....
576 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Mirando, 526 F.2d 1319, 1324 n.4
(2d Cir. 1975)). As in Bryant, this approach caused systemic reform of the evidence
preservation procedures by law enforcement and halted intentional destruction of Jencks
material. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 66 (2d Cir. 1980) (declining to
impose sanctions because the Jencks material was destroyed prior to the date of the court's
opinion in Bufalino); United States v. Paoli, 603 F.2d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that
"[n]o useful deterrent purpose would be served by penalizing the government for having
followed a policy which we understand has since been abandoned"); see also People v.
Hitch, 527 P.2d 361, 369 (Cal. 1974) (holding that, if "evidence cannot be disclosed because
of its intentional but nonmalicious destruction," sanctions shall be imposed "unless the
prosecution can show that the governmental agencies involved have established, enforced
and attempted in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic procedures designed to
preserve the [evidence]").
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preservation procedures and whether it instituted strict enforcement of
rigorous regulations for all those in the chain of custody to prevent loss or
destruction of discoverable evidence. The government's failure to take
these minimal steps to ensure that biological evidence is properly preserved
could tilt the balance toward the imposition of sanctions under the first
prong of the access to evidence sanctions analysis.
B. Prejudice Resulting from Destruction of Evidence
The second prong of the sanctions analysis is an assessment of the degree
of prejudice caused by the wrongful destruction of discoverable evidence.
In making this determination, the court considers, among other things, how
important or relevant the evidence is to the guilt determination. As
discussed above, when evidence cannot be disclosed because it has been
completely destroyed, the government bears the "heavy burden" of
demonstrating the defendant was not prejudiced and sanctions are not
warranted. 186 While the government may be able to shoulder this burden in
some cases, the task will be extremely difficult when a prisoner qualifies for
DNA testing under innocence protection laws. To qualify for
postconviction DNA testing, most innocence protection statutes mandate
that prisoners prove that identity was a disputed issue at trial and
demonstrate that DNA analysis on biological evidence would be either
outcome determinative or have a significant impact on the verdict reached
at trial. 187 If prisoners are unable to make this showing, the court could
dismiss the petition. Thus, among the prisoners that meet the rigorous
qualifications for postconviction DNA testing, the wrongful destruction of
biological evidence will invariably result in a very high degree of prejudice.
Moreover, DNA evidence has achieved a unique stature in the criminal
justice system above and beyond other forms of evidence. DNA evidence
is now widely regarded as having superior probative value and credibility in
proving identity in criminal cases. 188 In fact, a recent report issued by the
National Academy of Sciences, 189 a comprehensive exploration of the use
186. See United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 377-78 (9th Cir. 1976); supra notes
116-20 and accompanying text.
187. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 547.035(4)-(5) (West 2002) (mandating that postconviction
petitions for DNA testing must allege facts demonstrating, inter alia, that "[i]dentity was an
issue [at] trial" and "[a] reasonable probability exists that the movant would not have been
convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the requested DNA testing"); see
also Jones, supra note 18, at 1251-52.
188. See Garrett, supra note 151, at 64 & n.32 ("DNA testing provides the most accurate
and powerful scientific proxy available to establish biological identity; it sets the 'gold
standard' for other forms of forensic analysis."); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions
and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REv. 163, 171 (2007)
(describing DNA profiling as "the current gold standard in forensic science"); see also
People v. Pitts, 828 N.E.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. 2005) ("These statutory requirements... reflect the
vital importance and potential exonerating power of DNA testing.").
189. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at S-1 to S-3, on file with the Fordham Law
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(and abuse) of forensic science in the justice system, found that DNA
analysis has a "higher degree of reliability and relevance than any other
forensic technique."' 190  Further, as is demonstrated with over 200
exonerations, DNA evidence, standing alone, has the persuasive force to
prove that an innocent person has been wrongly convicted, notwithstanding
all other evidence used at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.191
Thus, in cases where identity is a disputed issue, the wrongful destruction
of DNA evidence will result in a heightened level of prejudice.
Finally, the prejudice caused by the loss of DNA evidence is manifested
in the reality that, in many cases, relief from a wrongful conviction through
the normal appellate process is virtually impossible without DNA
evidence. 192 Among the first 200 DNA exonerations, direct appeals were
filed in the vast majority of cases, and additional collateral appeals were
filed in many others.' 93 In nearly every case, the convictions of innocent
people were affirmed by courts. 194 Later, armed with exculpatory DNA
evidence, these same prisoners were exonerated. 195  These findings,
coupled with the superior persuasive power of DNA evidence, demonstrate
Review) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE]. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 109-108,
119 Stat. 2290 (2005), Congress authorized the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a
study of forensic science and directed the formation of a Forensic Science Committee to,
among other things, study the range of forensic science technologies and make
recommendations for the improvement and advancement of these technologies in solving
crimes and protecting the public. Over more than two years, the committee reviewed
volumes of research, received testimony from a broad spectrum of law enforcement, criminal
justice, and medical experts, and then issued its long-awaited evaluation of the various
forensic science technologies currently in use in the American justice system. See
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra.
190. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 189 (manuscript at 1-5, 1-10); see
also id. (manuscript at 5-5) (concluding that DNA is superior forensic evidence because
"DNA analysis also has been subjected to more scrutiny than any other forensic science
discipline, with rigorous experimentation and validation performed prior to its use in
forensic investigations" and, "[a]s a result of these characteristics, the probative power of
DNA is high").
191. See id. (manuscript at 1-6) (noting that DNA analysis performed on old evidence has
exposed the inaccuracies of other forms of evidence used to prove identity); see also Wade
v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 248 (D. Mass. 2006) (discussing cases where identity was a
disputed issue and DNA evidence could have been used to exculpate the defendant, and
commenting that "[t]he limits of human fallibility have advanced, making it possible to
improve on earlier decisions, even after accounting for erosion of memory and dispersion of
witness concerns," and, "[a]s a result, the adjudication at trial is no longer the most reliable
determination of guilt or innocence possible for this limited set of cases" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
192. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM. TO ENSURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT,
CONVICTING THE GUILTY 1 (2006) [hereinafter ACHIEVING JUSTICE] ("[Plost-trial appellate
remedies, at their best, are not designed to correct wrongful convictions or prevent them
from happening.... [DNA exonerations] question the assumption that the system our nation
has so proudly developed sufficiently protects the innocent.").
193. Garrett, supra note 151, at 94.
194. See id. at I 10-13.
195. Id.
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both the profound impact of the use of DNA evidence in a case and the vast
void created when DNA evidence has been destroyed.
Thus, when the government cannot comply with the disclosure
obligations imposed by innocence protection laws due to the destruction of
DNAI. evidence, the heightened level of prejudice should militate in favor of
the imposition of sanctions.
C. An Assessment of the Strength of the Government's Case
The third prong of the access to evidence sanctions analysis is the
assessment of the strength of the government's case. While the prejudice
prong of the analysis focuses on the import of the destroyed evidence, the
evaluation of the strength of the government's case seeks to determine
whether, in light of the other evidence of guilt, the destroyed evidence
would have made a difference in the ultimate verdict. 196 If the conviction
was based solely or largely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness who was thoroughly impeached at trial, the weakness of the
government's proof of guilt could tilt the balance toward the imposition of
sanctions. Alternatively, and more commonly, a reviewing court could
conclude that the government's evidence so convincingly proved the
defendant's guilt that the destroyed evidence would not have affected the
outcome in the case and, therefore, sanctions are not warranted.
Although a posttrial merits analysis is common in appellate and other
postconviction litigation, 197  DNA exonerations have exposed the
unreliability of judicial assessments of the government's evidence.
Specifically, reviewing courts tend to focus on the perceived persuasiveness
of certain categories of evidence (e.g., a confession) or focus solely on the
sheer volume of evidence presented at trial (e.g., the number of
eyewitnesses). DNA exonerations have proven that this analysis can be
fatally flawed and does not consistently expose wrongful convictions of
innocent people. In numerous DNA exonerations, a reviewing court's
assessment of the government's case as "strong" or even "overwhelming,"
was later proven to be inaccurate when subsequent DNA testing proved to a
scientific certainty that the defendant was factually innocent. 198
196. See United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 69 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating that
the loss of evidence "undermines [the court's] confidence in the outcome of the trial").
197. Garrett, supra note 151, at 107-08.
198. E.g., Holdren v. Legursky, 16 F.3d 57, 63 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he evidence
overwhelmingly [was] sufficient to support the jury's verdict."); Godschalk v. Montgomery
County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying petition
for postconviction DNA testing and finding that defendant's confession, which contained
details of the rapes that were not available to the public, represented "overwhelming
evidence of the appellant's guilt," completely separate from the identification of the
defendant by the rape victim (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v.
Daye, 223 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580 (Ct. App. 1986) (depublished by order of California Supreme
Court) ("The People's case against Daye was strong. There was overwhelming direct
evidence of his guilt."); People v. Cruz, No. 70407, 1992 Ill. LEXIS 221, at *2 (Ill. Dec. 4,
1992) ("The evidence adduced at trial implicating the defendant in the murder... was
overwhelming."); People v. Deskovic, 607 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1994) ("There was
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Prior to the success of DNA analysis in proving actual innocence, courts
were perhaps justified in accepting admissible evidence at face value and
assuming that all admissible evidence was reliable and accurate. Today,
after DNA evidence has proven that over 200 people have been convicted in
our justice system by admissible evidence, this assumption is no longer
valid. It is now clear that evidence can be both legally admissible and
completely unreliable. Based on numerous national
99 and state-wide200
studies conducted since 1996, four categories of admissible evidence have
emerged as the leading causes of wrongful convictions: (1) eyewitness
identifications; (2) non-DNA forensic analysis of physical evidence; (3)
testimony of jailhouse informants; and (4) confessions obtained during
custodial interrogations. 20 1 As discussed more fully below, from the tainted
procedures used to secure the evidence to the manner in which this evidence
is presented at trial, each of these categories of evidence are potentially
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt .. "); State v. Brown, No. L-82-297, 1983
WL 6945, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1983) ("[T]he evidence overwhelmingly
support[ed] appellant's guilt."); see also People v. McSherry, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630, 636 (Ct.
App. 1992) (depublished by order of California Supreme Court) (even after DNA evidence
excluded the defendant, the court characterized the government's evidence as
"overwhelmingly identifying appellant as the perpetrator"); Garrett, supra note 151, at 107-
09 & n.198 (citing numerous other DNA exoneration cases where the court's pre-DNA
assessment of the merits of the case characterized the proof of guilt as "overwhelming").
199. E.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 11-78; CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, Nw. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (2005), available at
http://72.3.233.244/pdfs/drugpolicy/cntronwrongfulconvictionsthesnitchsystem.pdf; EDWARD
CONNORS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf (one of the first studies examining twenty-eight of
the earliest DNA exonerations); JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED (2000) (examining the first sixty-eight DNA exonerations); Garrett, supra note
151; Gross et al., supra note 151 (examining the first two hundred DNA exonerations).
200. E.g., CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (n.d.), available
at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf, INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., A
VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (2005), available at www.exonerate.org/ICVA/
full-r.pdf; COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/
ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/summary_recommendations.pdf; THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT, supra note 21 (discussing the DNA exonerations in the state of New York);
Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the history of wrongful convictions cases in
Massachusetts with detailed case profiles); John T. Rago, A Fine Line Between Chaos &
Creation: Lessons on Innocence Reform from the Pennsylvania Eight, 12 WIDENER L. REV.
359 (2006) (discussing the history of wrongful convictions cases in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania); North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission,
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
201. Among the first 200 DNA exonerations, in some cases the government used two or
more of these categories of evidence to secure a conviction. See Garrett, supra note 151, at
78-91. Other factors that have played a significant role in causing wrongful convictions
include police and prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at
85.
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fraught with serious deficiencies that can lead to wrongful convictions. In
response to DNA exonerations, there have been reforms implemented in
several jurisdictions across the countr. 202  Thus, when evaluating the
strength of the government's case, courts should subject these specific
categories of evidence to greater scrutiny before concluding that they add
strength to the government's case.203 Without implementation of the
safeguards dictated by "post-DNA" reforms, eyewitness identifications,
non-DNA forensic evidence, jailhouse informant testimony, and
uncorroborated confessions, though admissible, may be unreliable evidence
that dilutes the strength of the government's case and militates in favor of
imposing sanctions for the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence.
1. Eyewitness Identifications
Every major study of wrongful convictions in the last decade has
concluded that eyewitness misidentification is the most common cause of
wrongful convictions in America.20 4  Of the first 200 DNA-based
exonerations, 79% of the cases involved an eyewitness misidentification. 205
One of the flaws of eyewitness identifications is caused by the way the
human brain stores and retrieves information. 20 6 Well-intentioned crime
victims and other eyewitnesses simply make honest mistakes when
attempting to identify strangers encountered under the rapid, unanticipated,
and stressful circumstances of a criminal act. 207 Studies have shown that
the problem is exacerbated when the witness is tasked with accurately
identifying a person of a different race, also known as a "cross-racial"
202. See infra Part II.C. 1-4. See generally Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process,
41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133 (2008).
203. See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the
Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1281, 1331-32 (2004)
(discussing the proposed "unsafe verdict" standard in use in Britain for review of factual
innocence claims in criminal cases). Under this unsafe verdict standard, the judicial review
would
carry a special obligation when a conviction is undergirded primarily with
evidence known to be of questionable reliability, such as stranger-on-stranger
eyewitness identification or "jailhouse snitch" testimony.... [I]t would oblige a
court to consider any relevant fresh evidence, including research results casting
doubt on the kind of evidence relied upon at trial ....
Id. at 1332.
204. E.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at xvii; DWYER ET AL., supra note 199, at
73; Garrett, supra note 151, at 78-79; Gross et al., supra note 151, at 542.
205. Garrett, supra note 151, at 60; see also INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note
200, at 32 (stating that eyewitness misidentification led to the wrongful conviction of nine of
the eleven cases reviewed by the Commission).
206. See Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 195 (2006) (explaining that "human
memory is more selective than a video camera" and "human memory can change in dramatic
and unexpected ways because of the passage of time or subsequent events").




identification. 208 Among the first 200 DNA-based exonerations, almost all
involved "stranger" misidentifications, and nearly 48% of the
misidentifications were made by a witness of a different race than the
suspect. 2
09
Another factor contributing to inaccurate eyewitness testimony is the
flawed pretrial identification procedures used by law enforcement officers.
Prior to the witness taking the stand at trial and pointing the accusatory
finger at the defendant, the defendant's image is frequently presented to the
witness in an array of photographs or in a live lineup. Actions taken by law
enforcement officers before, during, and after these procedures can
purposely or unwittingly prompt or encourage the witness to identify a
specific person. 210 As a result, witnesses guess which person they believe
police want them to select, or they select the person who most resembles
the perpetrator.
211
There is no longer much serious debate that these procedures, without
proper safeguards, can yield unreliable evidence and lead to wrongful
convictions.212  Following extensive research and evaluation, "best
practices" standards for law enforcement have been developed by
researchers and legal scholars. 213 These eyewitness identification reform
208. David E. Aaronson, Cross-Racial Identification of Defendants in Criminal Cases: A
Proposed Model Jury Instruction, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 4, 4; see ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4-13, at 105 (4th ed. 2007)
(offering several explanations for "cross-race effects" including limited contact with
individuals of other races and a lack of attention paid to individuals of other races).
209. Garrett, supra note 151, at 78-79.
210. See also Schmechel et al., supra note 206, at 203-04 (citing authorities).
211. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 32-40 (discussing the shortcomings of
lineups, photo spreads, and show-ups, and exploring ways to reduce suggestion by police).
212. CONNORS ET AL., supra note 199, at 39-44, 49-51, 53-59, 67-68 (discussing
eyewitness misidentification based on lineup and photo array procedures that led to wrongful
convictions among the first twenty-eight DNA exonerations, e.g., Ronnie Bullock (lineup),
Leonard Callace (photo array), Terry Leon Chalmers (photo array), Ronald Cotton (lineup),
Frederick Rene Daye (lineup), Edward Green (photo array and lineup), Ricky Hammond
(photo array), William O'Dell Harris (lineup), Edward Honaker (photo lineup), Brian
Piszczek (photo array)); see also INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 200, at 13-24
(discussing wrongful convictions of Marvin Anderson, Troy Webb, and Arthur Lee
Whitfield, all based on eyewitness misidentification during photographic array or
photographic line-up procedures).
213. Nearly a decade ago, the U.S. Department of Justice took the lead on eyewitness
identification reform by proposing, among other things, double-blind sequential
identification procedures, which require (1) the conducting of identification procedures by an
officer unfamiliar with the identity of the suspect to eliminate the possibility of
contamination or coaching; and (2) the presentation of the suspects to the witness one at a
time (not in a group) to discourage "comparison shopping." NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 8-9 (1999), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf, see, e.g.,
CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 24-34; INNOCENCE
COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 200, at 36-42; VT. HOUSE & SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.,
REPORT OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION STUDY
COMMITrEE (2007), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2008ExtemalReports/
228563.pdf. These standards have also been endorsed by the American Bar Association.
ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 23-26. See generally Sandra Guerra Thompson,
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laws have been enacted or implemented in several jurisdictions.214 Courts
have allowed the defense to introduce expert testimony to educate the jury
on problems with eyewitness identifications 215 and/or special jury
instructions on the specific challenges with cross-racial identifications.
216
When assessing the strength of the government's case, if the proof of
guilt is based largely or exclusively on eyewitness identification evidence,
particularly a "stranger" and/or cross-racial identification, courts should not
automatically accord great weight to this evidence without careful scrutiny
of the facts surrounding the identification.21 7 In cases where the witness
What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 33, 40-55 (2008) (discussing the various eyewitness identification reforms
proposed and adopted across the country).
214. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-284.50 to .53 (2007) (mandating, among other things,
double-blind sequential identification procedures for lineups); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(5)
(West 2006) (requiring "[t]o the extent feasible" double-blind sequential identification
procedures); N.J. ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO
AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf (recommending double-blind sequential
lineups); see THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW 16
(n.d.), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack-eyewitness
id-fin21.pdf (stating that double-blind sequential identification procedures have been
implemented in several municipal jurisdictions, including Boston, Massachusetts, Virginia
Beach, Virginia, and Santa Clara, California); see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note
21, at 5 (stating that seventeen states have considered eyewitness identification reform
legislation and that bills have passed in five states).
215. See Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 483-84 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
erroneous exclusion of expert testimony on the unreliable nature of eyewitness identification
prejudiced the defendant); see also ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 41-42 & nn.73-
74 (listing cases where courts have approved expert testimony on the deficiencies in
eyewitness identification testimony); Aaronson, supra note 208, at 11-12 (collecting
authorities); Findley, supra note 26, at 922-23 & n.132 (noting that courts have become
increasingly more receptive to expert testimony on eyewitness identifications and citing
federal and state cases allowing expert eyewitness identification testimony, including courts
in Montana, California, and Wisconsin); see also Schmechel et al., supra note 206, at 185-
88 (listing jurisdictions where courts have given trial judges varying degrees of discretion to
decide whether to allow expert eyewitness identification testimony).
216. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 43-44 (citing authorities). In State v.
Long, the court cited with approval the following special jury instruction on cross-racial
misidentification:
In considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you should consider...
whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification by
a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of
the same race.
721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Telfaire, 469
F.2d 552, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (advocating for jury instructions on
interracial identification); Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 340 (Del. 2003) (refusing to
reverse trial court's decision to give a jury instruction regarding cross-racial identification);
Aaronson, supra note 208, at 8-10 (citing cross-racial identification jury instructions
approved by courts in California, Utah, New Jersey, Maryland, and Massachusetts).
217. Cf Risinger, supra note 203, at 1316-18 (stating that the "unsafe verdict" grounds
for granting a new trial in criminal cases in the British legal system is usually invoked when




made a pretrial identification at a lineup or through a photo array, the court
should also examine whether best practices were followed pretrial or
whether other precautionary measures were taken at trial to reduce the
serious risk of misidentification and wrongful conviction.
2. Forensic Science Errors
An examination of the first 200 DNA exonerations reveals that the use of
faulty forensic evidence is the second leading cause of wrongful
convictions. 218 In 113 DNA exonerations, the government introduced some
form of non-DNA forensic evidence to link the defendant to the crime.
219
Non-DNA forensic evidence includes the analysis of hair, fibers, bite
marks, fingerprints, handwriting, blood, and tool marks.220  While DNA
testing is used in about five percent of criminal cases, 221 the most common
types of forensic evidence used to establish identity are serological evidence
(the analysis of bodily fluids)222 and microscopic hair comparison
analysis. 223 Until DNA exonerations exposed the inaccuracies of several
forms of traditionally admissible forensic evidence, the reliability of this
evidence was largely assumed without serious exploration of whether there
was a sound scientific foundation to support the conclusions reached by
forensic experts at trial. 224  The full extent of the inaccuracy and
unreliability of non-DNA forensic evidence was disclosed in the National
Academy of Sciences report.225 The report appropriately acknowledges
that forensic science errors have led to wrongful convictions and levels
sharp criticism on the forensic science community for the profound lack of
scientific research or protocols to support the analytical procedures it uses
218. Garrett, supra note 151, at 81.
219. Id.; see ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 48 (establishing that one-third of the
first sixty-two DNA exonerations involved "'tainted or fraudulent science' (quoting DWYER
ET AL., supra note 199, at 246)).
220. See Giannelli, supra note 188, at 166 (providing statistics on the number of wrongful
convictions for different types of non-DNA forensic evidence).
221. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 49.
222. Among the first twenty-eight DNA exonerations, serological evidence was used in
several cases, for instance, Mark Diaz Bravo ("Blood tests done on a blanket near the crime
scene showed a blood type consistent with Bravo's blood type .... "); Charles Dabbs (ABO
typing of semen stain consistent with defendant); Gerald Wayne Davis (chemist testified that
defendant "could not [be] exclude[d]" as source of semen); and Edward Green (defendant
had same blood type as assailant). CONNORS ET AL., supra note 199, at 37-38, 46-49, 53.
223. Several of the first twenty-eight DNA exonerations relied on this type of
comparison. See id. at 38-39, 51-55, 57-58. For example, in Dale Brison's case, hair from
the crime scene was "consistent" with the defendant. In Gary Dotson's case, pubic hair at
the crime scene was "similar to" the defendant. In Ricky Hammond's case, hairs found in
the defendant's car were "similar" to the victim's hair. In Edward Honaker's case, the hair
sample was "unlikely to match anyone" other than the defendant. Id.
224. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 189 (manuscript at 3-2) (noting that
the greatest problem with "heavy reliance" on forensic evidence is "whether-and to what
extent-there is science in any given 'forensic science' discipline").
225. See generally id.
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and the conclusions it reaches. 226 The report found that there is little or no
"science" to confirm the validity of several commonly used forms of
forensic evidence, including fingerprints, 227 human hair,
228 handwriting,229
and bite marks.230 The report also criticizes the criminal justice system for
allowing forensic evidence of dubious validity to be admitted at trial and
finds that courts across the country have been "utterly ineffective" in
addressing the "serious shortcomings" of non-DNA forensic evidence.
231
The report finds that the existing legal regime-including the rules
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards
governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the
adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence-is
inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic
science disciplines .... [E]very effort must be made to limit the risk of
having the reliability of certain forensic science methodologies judicially
certified before the techniques have been properly studied and their
accuracy verified. 232
226. Id. (manuscript at 3-1 to 3-2).
227. Id. (manuscript at 5-7 to 5-14) (finding that the ACE-V analytical technique for
fingerprint or Friction Ridge analysis is "not specific enough to qualify as a validated
method" and there is no universal standard protocol in place to ensure consistency and
accuracy). The report also found that the persistent claims that fingerprint analysis has a
zero error rate are "not scientifically plausible." Id. (manuscript at 5-12). The report
concludes that there is "considerable room" for additional research to validate the long-held
"presumption" that each person has unique fingerprints. Id. (manuscript at 5-13 to 5-14).
228. Id. (manuscript at 5-22 to 5-26). This report found that, while microscopic hair
comparison analysis can be useful to narrow the field of potential donors, there is "no
scientific support" for using this technique to isolate and identify a specific person as the
source of an unknown sample of hair. Id. (manuscript at 5-26). The report also found that
forensic hair analysis is unsupported by any "scientifically accepted statistics" or the
existence of any uniform standards regarding the number of consistent features that must be
present before an examiner can reasonably opine that two hairs likely originated from the
same person. Id. (manuscript at 5-25 to 5-26).
229. Id. (manuscript at 5-27 to 5-30) (noting that handwriting analysis (also known as
forensic document examination) is based on the "high likelihood that no two persons write
the same way" and concluding that, while "there may be a scientific basis for handwriting
comparison," more research is needed to quantify the reliability of the methodology and
determine the error rate).
230. Id. (manuscript at 5-35 to 5-37) (concluding that there is "no evidence of an existing
scientific basis for identifying an individual to the exclusion of all others" using forensic
odontology, or the comparison of bite marks or dental impressions left on evidence). The
report also noted that several innocent people convicted based on forensic odontology
evidence have been exonerated by subsequent DNA tests. Id. (manuscript at 5-37).
231. Id. (manuscript at 1-14).
232. Id. (manuscript at 3-1); see also id. (manuscript at 1-4) (noting that there are "serious
questions and concerns about the validity and reliability of some forensic methods and
techniques and how forensic evidence is reported to juries and courts"); id. (manuscript at 3-
3) (noting that "the interpretation of forensic evidence is not infallible" and that "[tihis
reality is not always fully appreciated or accepted by many forensic science practitioners,




Even assuming the validity and accuracy of some forms of non-DNA
forensic evidence, another problem exposed by DNA exonerations is the
extent of the misrepresentation of the forensic findings by forensic science
professionals and the lack of standards governing the operations at crime
labs. In numerous cases, forensic professionals have testified and attempted
to make their forensic findings into dispositive proof of guilt by
exaggerating and misrepresenting the significance of their conclusions or
engaging in other forms of misconduct, including perjury. 233 In addition,
crime labs in several jurisdictions have been plagued by scandals involving
numerous employees and affecting hundreds of cases. 234
Legal scholars and researchers have proposed broad, sweeping reforms
designed to decrease reporting errors by forensic professionals and improve
the overall quality and accuracy of work performed in crime labs. 235 A few
jurisdictions have implemented these reforms, which include compliance
with national accreditation standards, mandatory certification for forensic
science professionals, and regular independent reviews of the work
performed by the lab.236 In most jurisdictions, however, forensic labs
remain largely unregulated.
Finally, certain categories of forensic evidence have recently been
discredited or seriously questioned by courts across the country, including
the analysis of the lead content in bullets,237 handwriting samples, 238 audio
233. E.g., Giannelli, supra note 188, at 166-70 (discussing problems at numerous crime
labs across the country, including staff incompetence, sloppy procedures, fraud, perjured
testimony, false laboratory reports, and faked autopsies); see also Findley, supra note 26, at
935-37 (providing examples of overstatement or misrepresentation of forensic evidence
uncovered by DNA exonerations).
234. Findley, supra note 26, at 936-37; Giannelli, supra note 188, at 166-68 & nn.14-27
(detailing scope of forensic laboratory scandals at FBI crime laboratory, the state crime labs
in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Montana, and Virginia, as well as the crime labs in major
metropolitan areas, including Chicago and Houston); see also Erin Murphy, The New
Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific
Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 754-56 (2007); Ben Schmitt & Joe Swickard, Troubled
Crime Lab Shuttered, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 2008, at B 1.
235. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 186 (manuscript at 7-1 to 7-19)
(proposing accreditation and quality control standards for crime labs and the creation of a
code of ethics, proficiency testing, and mandatory certification for forensic science
professionals); see Giannelli, supra note 188, at 211-27 (discussing specific quality
assurance measures and protocols to be followed to prevent erroneous test results and/or
fraud); id. at 212 (detailing that across the country over 240 crime labs are now accredited by
the American Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board
(ASCLD/LAB) and noting that New York, Oklahoma, and Texas require their labs to be
accredited); see also ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 121-22 (ABA resolution
recommending accreditation standards).
236. Giannelli, supra note 188, at 212; supra note 235.
237. Bullet Lead Analysis or Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis was a technique used by
forensic scientists in criminal cases where no weapon was recovered or when the bullet
recovered from the crime scene was too mutilated for standard ballistics analysis of physical
markings. Applying the scientific theory of Bullet Lead Analysis, the crime scene bullet
would be compared to bullets recovered from the defendant to determine whether the bullets
"match" based on their purported unique chemical composition. After use of this technique
from 1980-2004 in approximately 2500 cases, the FBI permanently discontinued its use
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voice recordings, 239 and fingerprints. 240 As most petitions for DNA testing
are usually filed several years after the original conviction, it is likely that
courts will confront cases involving prisoners convicted several years
before based on the weight of these types of forensic evidence.
Therefore, when evaluating the strength of the government's evidence, a
reviewing court should carefully scrutinize non-DNA forensic evidence and
make an independent determination of whether the science is reliable and
whether the scientific analysis is accurately reported. In light of the fatal
weaknesses that have been exposed in this evidence in recent years, the
court must determine whether this evidence should be accorded any weight
in the assessment of the strength of the government's case.
after an outside review by the National Academy of Science concluded that there was an
"inability of scientists and manufacturers to definitively evaluate the significance of an
association between bullets made in the course of a bullet lead examination." Press Release,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Laboratory to Increase Outreach in Bullet Lead Cases
(Nov. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/bulletleadl 11707.htm;
see also Paul C. Giannelli, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis: An Update, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2008, at 24, 26-27 (summarizing the National Academy of Sciences study, the FBI
response, and the subsequent cases where Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis evidence was
excluded).
238. Following the Supreme Court's rulings in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), a
minority of courts have flatly rejected handwriting comparison analysis expert testimony.
E.g., United States v. Brewer, No. 01 CR 892, 2002 WL 596365, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16,
2002) (excluding the government's handwriting analysis evidence because the government
failed to "prove the reliability of the handwriting comparison testimony"); United States v.
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (D. Alaska 2001) (rejecting government's proffered
expert handwriting analysis testimony as unreliable); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d
939, 940 (N.D. II1. 2000) ("Handwriting analysis does not stand up well under the Daubert
standards."). See generally D. Michael Risinger, Appendix: Cases Involving the Reliability
of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REv.
477 (2007) (providing comprehensive analysis of state and federal cases decided since
1993). Other courts have allowed limited expert testimony but precluded handwriting
experts from testifying that there was a match between the defendant's handwriting and the
disputed sample. E.g., United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1193 (D. Neb.
2000); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v.
Santillan, No. CR-96-40169, 1999 WL 1201765, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999); see also
supra note 230.
239. Findley, supra note 26, at 965 n.347 (explaining that five states have rejected
voiceprint evidence).
240. Giannelli, supra note 188, at 203-08 (citing the lack of scientific support for the
accuracy of fingerprint analysis and discussing fingerprint identification errors in the FBI
laboratory); see also State v. Bryan Rose, No. K06-0545, slip. op. (Bait. County Cir. Ct. Oct.
19, 2007), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/forensics/forjlib/Documents/
1193671274.47/documentinfo (rejecting fingerprint evidence in death penalty case under
the Frye standard); Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 999 (2005) (citing twenty-
two cases of errors and false matches in forensic fingerprint analysis); Nathan Benedict,
Note, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why
Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 ARz. L. REv. 519, 519-20 (2004) (discussing
the Brandon Mayfield case, where a Portland lawyer was wrongly arrested and detained
based on an error matching his fingerprints to a latent fingerprint found in connection with a
bombing in Spain); see also supra note 228.
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3. Jailhouse Informant Testimony
The third category of evidence that has been consistently identified as a
leading cause of wrongful convictions is the testimony of a jailhouse
informant, commonly referred to as a "snitch" or "cooperating witness." 
241
While it is not uncommon for the government to rely on the testimony of
accomplices, informants, and others associated with the defendant for
insider information about the defendant's criminal acts, it has been noted
that "[t]he most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims
another prisoner has confessed to him." 242 The heightened unreliability of
jailhouse informant testimony stems from the fact that, unlike the
accomplice or coconspirator, the jailhouse informant is not implicated in the
crime being reported to police. Thus, in giving incriminating testimony
against a defendant in exchange for leniency or other considerations, the
jailhouse informant has "nothing to lose and everything to gain. '243 The
concern over the accuracy and reliability of this testimony is well justified.
Among the first 200 DNA exonerations, 35 innocent people were wrongly
convicted based, in part, on false testimony provided by these
"incentivized" government witnesses. 244 Moreover, a comprehensive study
of 111 death row exonerations over a 30-year period found that jailhouse
snitch testimony figured prominently in nearly 50% of all death row
exonerations. 2
45
241. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 67 (defining the jailhouse snitch as
"'someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused
while incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously' (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11J-21(a) (West 2004)).
242. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996). Judge Stephen S. Trott of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit wrote,
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal charged with a serious
crime understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble with the law is ... to cut
a deal at someone else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government by
offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for reduced incarceration.
... [E]ach contract for testimony is fraught with the real peril that the proffered
testimony will not be truthful ....
North Marina Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2001); CAL. COMM'N ON
THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 48 ("The Commission concluded that the
testimony of in-custody informants potentially presents even greater risks than the testimony
of accomplices, who are incriminating themselves as well as the defendant."); THE JUSTICE
PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 1 (2007), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/snitch-lr.pdf (stating that, "[b]ecause
jailhouse snitches are so desperate to attain sentence reductions, snitch testimony is widely
regarded as the least reliable testimony encountered in the criminal justice system").
243. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 242, at 1.
244. Garrett, supra note 151, at 86; see also State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 327-33).
245. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 199, at 3 (reporting that of the 111
persons released from death row from 1973-2004, jailhouse informant testimony was a
contributing factor in the wrongful conviction in 45.9% of the cases).
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Despite the instinctive distaste for testimony from jailhouse informers,
this evidence is legally admissible. 246 Since the proliferation of DNA-
based exonerations that have consistently proven this evidence to be
unreliable, several jurisdictions have proposed or enacted reforms to restrict
the use of this testimony at trial. In Illinois, a statute was enacted that
prevents a conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a
jailhouse informant in death penalty cases. 247 Also, some district attorneys'
offices have developed written policies and stringent approval procedures to
restrict the use of "in-custody informants" as witnesses. 248 Other reforms
that have been both proposed and enacted include requiring pretrial
disclosure of agreements with jailhouse informants, mandatory pretrial
"reliability" hearings, and independent corroboration of the testimony as a
prerequisite to admissibility.249 Some jurisdictions also require standard
cautionary instructions to the jury at trial to view the testimony of a
jailhouse informant with great caution or "with greater care than the
testimony of an ordinary witness." 250  These reforms are specifically
designed to prevent the jury from relying on potentially unreliable evidence.
Thus, when proof of guilt is based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse
informant and safeguards were not taken to ensure the reliability of the
testimony, the court should accord little or no weight to this notoriously
unreliable evidence in assessing the strength of the government's case.
4. False Confessions
The use of the defendant's own incriminating words is one of the most
powerful and most persuasive forms of evidence of guilt. In some cases,
the prosecution is based almost exclusively on the defendant's
uncorroborated confession.25' Although many people may still believe that
246. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 76-77 (discussing various attempts by
courts to address the unreliable nature of informant testimony with cautionary jury
instructions); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 242, at 6-7 (discussing cases where courts
admit informant testimony with cautionary jury instructions).
247. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21(c)-(d) (West 2008) (requiring a showing by a
preponderance of evidence that the informant's testimony is reliable); CAL. COMM'N ON THE
FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 49 (proposing enactment of statute mandating
corroboration of in-custody informant testimony); see also ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note
192, at 63 (reporting that, according to the 2005 ABA Resolution 108B, "the American Bar
Association urges federal, state, local and territorial governments to reduce the risk of
convicting the innocent... by ensuring that no prosecution should occur based solely upon
uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony").
248. CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 47.
249. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21(d) (mandating pretrial reliability
hearings as a prerequisite to admissibility of informant testimony in capital cases).
250. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); see also CAL. COMM'N
ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 49-50 (proposing standard jury
instruction on reliability ofjailhouse informant testimony).
251. Garrett, supra note 151, at 89 (reporting that in 7 wrongful convictions cases among
the first 200 DNA exonerations, the false confession was the "central evidence of guilt," and
in 9 other cases, the false confession was "bolster[ed]" by jailhouse snitch testimony, an
eyewitness misidentification, or faulty forensic science evidence).
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a truly innocent person would never falsely confess to a crime-particularly
a serious crime-numerous national and state studies have shown that false
confessions, particularly in murder cases, are one of the leading causes of
wrongful convictions in America.252 Among the first 200 DNA-based
exonerations, the government introduced false confessions in 31 cases.
253
The rate of false confessions is higher among juveniles (39%),254 and
people suffering from mental illness or mental disability (35%).255 Another
factor that increases the likelihood of false confessions is the length of the
interrogation. 256 Research shows that 75% of false confessions were the
product of interrogation sessions that lasted 6 to 24 hours.257 In many
cases, the confession was due to police coercion, either psychological or
physical.258  In other cases, police officers testified falsely that the
defendant confessed to the crime during a closed interrogation session
when, in fact, the defendant never uttered the incriminating statements.
259
252. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 933-43 tbl.2, 946 (2004) (finding that, of 125
wrongful convictions based on false confessions between 1972 and 2000, 81% of false
confessions occurred in murder cases); Garrett, supra note 151, at 88-99; Gross et al., supra
note 151, at 524 (studying 340 exonerations: 144 DNA-based and 196 non-DNA-based); see
also CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 35; THE JUSTICE
PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 2
(n.d.), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack-recording-
fin2.pdf.
253. Garrett, supra note 151, at 73, 88.
254. Id. at 89; see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 23 (discussing the case
of fifteen-year-old Jeffrey Deskovic, who falsely confessed to a murder after being
interrogated by police officers for more than six hours); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note
252, at 10-12 (discussing the infamous "Central Park Jogger Case," in which five juveniles
(ages fourteen to sixteen) were wrongly convicted of the high-profile, brutal rape and vicious
beating of a woman in Central Park in New York on the strength of their confessions during
custodial interrogations, which the youths claimed included coercive and aggressive police
actions, such as slapping, yelling, cursing, and false promises).
255. Garrett, supra note 151, at 89 (in eleven exoneration cases, false confessions were
admitted at trial despite the fact that the defendants were mentally ill at the time of the
confession); see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing the case of
Douglas Wamey, a person with a history of mental issues, who confessed falsely to his
involvement in a murder after twelve hours of interrogation); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra
note 252, at 13-15 (reporting that Earl Washington, a mildly mentally retarded man, gave a
false confession that led to his wrongful conviction).
256. Drizin & Leo, supra note 252, at 948-49; see also Gross et al., supra note 151, at
544.
257. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 252, at 948-49 (explaining that 16% of the
interrogation sessions lasted less than 6 hours, 34% lasted 6 to 12 hours, and 39% lasted 12
to 24 hours).
258. Id.
259. See Garrett, supra note 151, at 89-90 (explaining that in several cases courts have
found confessions to be reliable because they were bolstered by nonpublic details of the
crime). When DNA evidence subsequently proved the confession to be false, it became
clear that the nonpublic details were the product of police action, e.g., "police fed facts,
asked leading questions, supplied details," or simply lied in reporting that the defendant
confessed. Id.; see MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON JR. passim (2003) (telling the story of a mentally retarded man who was
convicted based largely on the alleged confession made to police during custodial
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While coerced confessions are not admissible evidence in criminal
trials, 260 a defendant without independent proof of coercive police conduct
faces a steep uphill battle in trying to prove the confession was coerced.
Consequently, few of the wrongly convicted defendants prevailed in their
attempts to challenge the admissibility of confessions, even though DNA
would later prove their confessions were false. 261 To address the problem
of coerced false confessions, many jurisdictions across the country now
require the recording of the entire interrogation session as well as the
confession in homicides and other serious cases. 262 This reform has been
imposed by judicial mandate263 and by state statute264 and is now standard
police procedure in over 400 local police departments in all fifty states.
265
Therefore, in assessing the strength of the government's case, if the
government's proof of guilt was based largely or exclusively on the
defendant's confession, the court should determine whether there is any
corroboration of the incriminating statements attributed to the defendant. In
light of the comprehensive research and national reforms that have been
implemented across the country, the court should give less weight to
unrecorded or otherwise uncorroborated confessions, especially when the
confession was obtained during a lengthy custodial interrogation, involved
interrogation); THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, VICTIMS OF JUSTICE: REVISITED 56-75
(2005); SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTION ON DEALING WITH
THE DEATH PENALTY 30-31 (2003) (discussing the Rolondo Cruz cases, where police
testified to a fabricated confession).
260. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936) (holding that confessions
extracted by police brutality or violence violate the Due Process Clause).
261. Garrett, supra note 151, at 90-91 (noting that, of the wrongly convicted defendants
who challenged false, coerced confessions, none were successful on appeal).
262. E.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 11 (discussing ABA Resolution 8A,
which urges law enforcement agencies to "videotap[e] the entirety of custodial interrogations
of crime suspects" and urges legislatures and courts to "enact laws" requiring such
videotaping); CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 40
(recommending electronic recording of videotaping); INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra
note 200, at 54-58 (recommending videotaped interrogations).
263. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (ruling that recording
of interrogations was mandated by the due process clause of the Alaska state constitution);
State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (mandating statewide recording of
interrogations); SUPREME COURT OF N.J., ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION: RE: REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2005),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/recordation.pdf (requiring
interrogations to be recorded statewide, effective January 2006, for all homicide offenses).
264. In 2003, Illinois became the first state to pass legislation mandating the recordation
of interrogations. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1 (West 2006) (adults); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-401.5 (West 2006) (juveniles); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16
(2008), available at http://www.conwaygreene.com/nmsu/lpext.dll?f--templates&fn-main-
h.htm&2.0; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
968.073 (West 2008).
265. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, Nw. UNIV. SCH. OF
LAW, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS app. A (2004),
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/causesand
remedies/falseconfessions/sullivanreport.pdf (compiling a comprehensive listing of law
enforcement agencies in each U.S. city that has implemented videotaped interrogations).
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a juvenile, or involved a person who was mentally impaired at the time of
the alleged confession.
D. Summary
The access to evidence sanctions analysis provides a useful and effective
paradigm for the judicial determination of whether to impose sanctions for
the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence. The same concerns about the
presentation of all relevant evidence to enhance the truth-seeking function
of the court that justify imposing sanctions for other evidence destruction
violations likewise support sanctions when DNA evidence is wrongly
destroyed. The flexible three-prong test allows the court to take into
account all relevant considerations when determining whether to impose
sanctions. While negligent or inadvertent loss of evidence might not
warrant sanctions in every case, the government's failure to take any steps
to ensure that discoverable evidence is properly preserved, as well as the
government's failure to impose and enforce regulations for evidence
handlers on how to maintain and preserve DNA evidence, tilts the balance
toward imposing sanctions. Further, given the extremely probative value of
DNA evidence, the destruction of all testable biological evidence will
usually result in extreme prejudice to prisoners who seek testing under
innocence protection statutes. Finally, the proper assessment of the strength
of the government's case cannot be divorced from the collective wisdom
gained from over 200 DNA exonerations. If the government's evidence
was based largely or exclusively on the types of evidence that have been a
major factor in past wrongful convictions, the court must carefully
scrutinize this evidence to determine its reliability. The application of the
access to evidence sanctions analysis guides the court to a just and fair
determination of whether sanctions should be imposed when DNA evidence
is wrongly destroyed by the government.
III. FROM ACCESS TO EVIDENCE TO THE CASE OF ROBIN LOVITT
Whether or not Robin Lovitt is actually innocent, the judicial system
should have been able to address the government's destruction of
discoverable evidence and provide a legal remedy. While Lovitt could not
assert a basis for relief under the specific and unique provisions of the
Virginia statute or the Due Process Clause, 266 the Lovitt case provides a
useful vehicle to illustrate the effective application of the access to evidence
sanctions analysis to the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence in violation
of innocence protection laws.
A. The Facts
At trial, the government set out to prove that in the early morning hours
of November 18, 1998, Robin Lovitt was at the Champions Billiards pool
266. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
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hall when all other patrons had left and Clayton Dicks was the sole
employee on the premises. 267 The government's theory was that Lovitt and
Dicks argued when Dicks attempted to stop Lovitt from stealing the cash
drawer.268 According to the government, the argument escalated and Lovitt
fatally stabbed Dicks with a pair of orange-handled scissors. 269 Lovitt then
fled the bar with the cash drawer, dropping the bloody scissors in the woods
behind the pool hall as he made his escape.
270
When Lovitt turned himself in to the police a few days after the murder,
he admitted that he had stolen the cash drawer, but denied killing Dicks.
271
Lovitt told police that he was in the bathroom of the pool hall using drugs at
the time Dicks was killed. When Lovitt came out and saw the killer
fighting with Dicks, he retreated back into the bathroom out of fear.
272
When the killer fled, Lovitt came out and saw that Dicks was dead.
According to Lovitt, he then took the cash drawer and fled to his cousin's
house where they pried it open and divided up the money.
273
The identity of the person who killed Clayton Dicks was the central issue
in the case. To prove that Lovitt was the killer, the government relied on an
eyewitness identification, testimony from a jailhouse snitch, and
inconclusive DNA evidence. First, the government presented the tepid
testimony of two eyewitnesses, both of whom consistently admitted-
pretrial, during trial, and posttrial-that they did not know Lovitt prior to
the murder, did not get a good look at the killer's face, and were not sure of
their identification of Lovitt as the assailant. 274 In fact, even though one of
the eyewitnesses was unable to identify Lovitt at the preliminary hearing,
he later testified at trial that he was "80% certain" Lovitt was the man he
saw stab Clayton Dicks.275 He admitted, however, that he only saw the
killer's face for a few seconds, and only from the side.
276
267. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth (Lovitt 1), 537 S.E.2d 866, 870 (Va. 2000).
268. See id. at 870-71.
269. Id. at 871.
270. Id. at 870-72.
271. Petition for Clemency Submitted to Gov. Mark R. Warner on Behalf of Robin M.
Lovitt and His Family 4-6 (July 5, 2005) [hereinafter Lovitt Clemency Petition] (on file with
the Fordham Law Review); see also Lovitt v. Warden (Lovitt IH), 585 S.E.2d 801, 813 (Va.
2003).
272. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 813; Lovitt Clemency Petition, supra note 271, at 5-6.
273. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 813.
274. Id.; see also Lovitt Clemency Petition, supra note 271, at 6.
275. Lovitt 1, 537 S.E.2d at 871. There was no pretrial lineup or photo array identification
procedure. In fact, one of the witnesses, Jos6 N. Alvarado, informed the police during a
pretrial interview that he was not sure he would be able to recognize the killer if he saw him
again and could not remember whether the killer had a beard or mustache. Lovitt Clemency
Petition, supra note 271, at 19. The other eyewitness, Carlos Clavell, was never asked at
trial to identify Lovitt. Id. Following Lovitt's conviction, Alvarado gave a statement to a
defense investigator admitting candidly that he felt confused and pressured to be more
definitive in identifying Lovitt and admitted that he was not sure whether he was "60% or
80% or 90% or 50% sure" that Robin Lovitt was the person he saw stab Clayton Dicks.
Letter from Thomas Yannucci, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, to Robert Crouch, Counsel for Gov.
Mark Warner 2-3 (Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
276. Lovitt Clemency Petition, supra note 271, at 19.
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The government also proffered the testimony of Casel Lucas, a
"seasoned" jailhouse informant and career criminal with thirteen prior
felony convictions. 277 According to Lucas, while he was serving a twenty-
year sentence for violent and sex-related crimes, he befriended Lovitt at the
Arlington County Jail while Lovitt was awaiting trial, and Lovitt confessed
to killing Dicks.278 Posttrial, Lovitt's attorneys learned that Lucas had
given the government a series of wildly inconsistent and incredible versions
of Lovitt's purported confession.
279
Next, the government called a state forensic scientist who analyzed two
spots of blood on the orange-handled scissors--one on the tip and another
near the handle-and three small spots of blood on Lovitt's jacket.280 The
expert analysis could only definitively establish that the victim's blood was
on the tip of the scissors, making the scissors the likely murder weapon.
281
Significantly, using the limited DNA analysis available in 1998, testing was
"inconclusive" on the second spot of blood located in the midsection of the
scissors and the blood found on Lovitt's jacket. 282 Thus, there was no
physical evidence linking Lovitt to the crime. 283 Notwithstanding, the
prosecutor argued to the jury that there was reason to believe that the
victim's blood was on Lovitt's jacket and that Lovitt's blood was on the
orange-handled scissors. 284
277. LovittII, 585 S.E.2d at 819; Lovitt I, 537 S.E.2d at 872.
278. Lovitt I, 537 S.E.2d at 877. Casel Lucas was housed with Lovitt at the county jail
for two months prior to Lovitt's trial. Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 807. According to Lucas,
Lovitt stated that he stayed in the bathroom until all the customers left the pool hall and then
attempted to open the cash register drawer. Id. Lovitt told Lucas that when Dicks confronted
him, Lovitt killed Dicks because Dicks could identify him. Id. Prior to trial, the defense was
unaware of the fact that every year for the four years leading up to the Lovitt trial, Lucas had
either reported a "jailhouse confession" by another inmate, testified against another inmate
in exchange for a lighter sentence, or gave statements to the police regarding different
homicides and other serious crimes. Id. at 812.
279. At one postconviction hearing, Lovitt's trial counsel testified that Lucas signed an
affidavit stating that he first told prosecutors that Lovitt "used a gun to shoot Dicks" and then
"discarded the weapon in a drain" and was driven from the scene of the crime by his cousin.
Lovitt II, 585 S.E.2d at 812-13.
280. Id. at 807.
281. Lovitt Clemency Petition, supra note 271, at 13-14.
282. Id. at 13. It was this biological evidence-blood on the scissors and on Lovitt's
jacket-that Lovitt was precluded from having analyzed under more advanced DNA testing
under the Virginia innocence protection statute due to the premature destruction by the court
clerk. See id. at 10-11; supra note 67 and accompanying text.
283. There were no fingerprints on the scissors, Lovitt I, 537 S.E.2d at 871-72, and all
other evidence presented by the government merely showed that Lovitt was at the bar,
needed money, and stole the cash box. Id. at 870-71. These facts are largely consistent with
Lovitt's version of the events, but do not directly identify Lovitt as the person who killed
Dicks.
284. Lovitt Clemency Petition, supra note 271, at 7, 12-13. Significantly, the evidence
showed that Dicks was stabbed six times in the chest and back at very close range, yet Lovitt
only had these three small spots of blood on the jacket he was wearing. Also, there was no
evidence presented at trial that Lovitt had cuts or injuries to his hands that would have been
consistent with his bleeding during the stabbing and the depositing of his blood on the
scissors, as the government contended.
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B. Access to Evidence Analysis
As a preliminary matter, there was never any dispute in Lovitt that the
government had a duty to preserve the biological evidence for
postconviction DNA testing under the Virginia statute. Nor was there any
dispute that this duty was breached when the evidence was destroyed by the
court clerk. If the court had the authority to impose sanctions under
Virginia law, the access to evidence analysis would have been a useful and
effective model.
With respect to the first prong of the access to evidence analysis, the
circumstances surrounding the destruction and degree of government
culpability, Lovitt convincingly established that the evidence was
intentionally destroyed by a government employee charged with
maintaining the evidence. While the court found that the evidence
destruction was not initiated or approved by the prosecutor's office, there
was also no evidence that prosecutors took any steps to ensure proper
preservation of the evidence after the new law was enacted. The record
shows that the government made no effort to educate the court clerks on the
new preservation law or to institute any regulations or procedures to ensure
that the biological evidence would be preserved as mandated by the
innocence protection statute. In fact, the court clerk directly responsible for
evidence preservation testified that he was completely unaware of the new
evidence preservation requirements. Lovitt did not, however, present
evidence to show that the intentional destruction of evidence in his case was
part of a pattern of government misconduct. Given that the statute had only
recently been enacted, Lovitt probably would not have been able to make
this showing.
The fact that the prosecutor's office failed to take steps to ensure
preservation of the evidence by overseeing the work of the clerk's office or
by providing the clerk's office with regulations or guidelines on compliance
with the new law weakens the government's position on the first prong of
the analysis. Conversely, the fact that the new postconviction evidence
preservation law was in effect for less than one month would not likely give
rise to the level of reckless noncompliance with preservation and disclosure
duties that courts have found sanctionable. On balance, the government's
conduct and involvement in the circumstances surrounding the destruction,
standing alone, do not strongly support the imposition of sanctions.
As to the prejudice prong of the sanctions analysis, however, Lovitt's
inability to seek more definitive DNA testing on the biological evidence
severely undercut his ability to prove his actual innocence and seek relief
under the Virginia innocence protection law. A subsequent, more advanced
DNA analysis of the blood on Lovitt's jacket and the blood on the scissors
could have disproved the government's argument at trial that there was
physical evidence linking Lovitt to the crime. First, analysis of the blood
on the jacket could have excluded the victim as the source. Second, at trial
the government's theory was that a lone killer committed the crime and the
killer left his blood on the murder weapon during the violent fatal
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encounter. Subsequent DNA analysis on the spot of blood near the handle
of the scissors might have revealed that the unidentified spot of blood
belonged to a third person, not Lovitt. This evidence would have strongly
supported Lovitt's misidentification defense, severely weakened the
government's case, and cast serious doubt on the verdict at trial. At a
minimum, the presence of another's blood on the murder weapon might
have warranted a new trial. The government also could have used the DNA
profile developed from blood on the scissors to correctly identify the real
killer and exonerate Lovitt.
As for the final prong of the analysis, the strength of the government's
case, the facts demonstrate that the government's case at trial was weak.
This was a prosecution based on (1) an uncertain eyewitness identification
from a witness who previously could not identify the defendant at all and
who could not make a strong identification at trial; (2) uncorroborated
testimony from a jailhouse snitch; and (3) the results of largely inconclusive
scientific evidence that did not link the defendant to the crime. The sum
total of this evidence is far from overwhelming. The single "tentative"
eyewitness identification and the "incentivized" testimony of the jailhouse
informant are the very forms of notoriously unreliable evidence that have
lead to many wrongful convictions over the last decade, especially where,
as in Lovitt's case, there is no evidence that any of the safeguards were in
place to ensure the accuracy of this evidence. In the end, the destruction of
the biological evidence prevented Lovitt from attacking the most persuasive
evidence presented by the government at trial. The overall weaknesses of
the government's case should tilt the balance in favor of the court imposing
sanctions for the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence.
In sum, using the access to evidence analysis, a reviewing court could
find that a sanction was warranted in Lovitt because the wrongful
destruction of evidence by the government was intentional, there was a
heightened level of prejudice because identity was a disputed issue in the
case, and the government's evidence at trial was not particularly strong or
overwhelming.
IV. APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS
After a court makes the determination to impose sanctions for the
wrongful destruction of evidence, the judge must then decide which
sanction among the range of possible sanctions is appropriate. Ideally, the
sanction imposed will cure the harm caused by the evidence destruction and
return the parties to the position they would have been in had the evidence
been disclosed. One judge observed,
When criminal evidence is lost or destroyed, the court must protect a
complex of interests, some conflicting. Our principal concern is to
provide the accused an opportunity to produce and examine all relevant
evidence, to insure a fair trial.... Other considerations which bear upon
the right to a fair trial are also present if intentional or culpable
government action has caused the loss or destruction. The significant
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interest in such cases is to avoid the impairment of judicial integrity that
would occur if the prosecution were allowed to manipulate court
processes, and protective rulings or sanctions may be required both to
insure a fair trial in a specific case and to deter future violations.
2 85
Thus, imposing sanctions for the wrongful destruction of discoverable
evidence advances three fundamental principles. First, sanctions protect the
right of litigants to present all relevant facts before the fact-finder and
ensure that the defendant in a criminal case has "an equal opportunity to
seek justice." 286 Sanctions also protect the "truth seeking" function of the
court; evidence destruction impairs the search for the truth because "[t]he
less evidence available, the less certain are the findings upon which a
judgment must rest."'287 Finally, sanctions are imposed to vindicate the
affront to judicial integrity that occurs if litigants are permitted to
manipulate the judicial process through nondisclosure. 288  Sanctions
provide a vehicle for courts to punish such misconduct and deter future
violations.
289
While trial courts have the power to craft a remedy to advance these
goals, judges do not have unfettered discretion in sanctioning evidence
destruction violations. Trial courts are specifically cautioned that a
"sanction should not be more punitive than is necessary to remedy the
discovery violation. ' 290 Courts are similarly warned to avoid, if possible,
imposing sanctions that have a fundamental impact on the outcome of the
285. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Solum & Marzen, supra note 23, at 1139; see GORELICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 15.
287. Solum & Marzen, supra note 23, at 1138, 1166.
288. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 16 (emphasizing the importance of sanctions
to "preserve[] the integrity of the judicial process"); see also Beale, supra note 38, at 1452-
54; id. at 1452 ("[C]ourts have an interest in judicial integrity that is distinct from their duty
to enforce the rights of the litigants.").
289. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 17 (maintaining that the court must sanction
evidence destruction to preserve the legitimacy of the judicial process); id. at 114 (cautioning
of the "need to control evidence destruction 'lest the fact-finding process in our courts be
reduced to a mockery' (quoting Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 25
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 423, 427 (N.D. Ind. 1977))); id. at 116 (explaining that
individuals that destroy evidence demonstrate "a desire to manipulate the judicial process").
290. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 97, § 11-7.1(a) commentary, at
114 (citation omitted); see United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 69 (D. Mass. 1994)
(seeking "to tailor the sanction to redress the prejudice experienced by the defendants");
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 97, § 11-7.1(b), at 115 (maintaining that
courts should have the "power to impose whatever sanction is necessary to return the parties
to a 'level playing field"'). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
Discovery and Trial by Jury advise that courts imposing discovery sanctions should take a
"flexible approach which fully cures the harm caused by the failure to disclose, while not
creating an undue advantage to the opposing side." Id. § 11.7.1(a) commentary, at 114; see
also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 167, at 961 (explaining that a sanction should not be
regarded as "'a bonus awarded without regard to its need in the furtherance of fair trial
rights' (quoting Miller v. State, 405 N.E.2d 909, 912 (Ind. 1980))).
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litigation.291 Against this backdrop, when the government's postconviction
destruction of all testable biological evidence thwarts DNA testing, there
are three appropriate sanctions available to the court: (1) sentence
reduction; (2) new trial; or (3) dismissal (i.e., vacating the conviction).
Because nondisclosure violations are generally discovered and cured
pretrial or during the adjudication stage, courts usually have a wider range
of sanctions available, ranging from striking testimony to granting a
continuance or giving an adverse inference instruction. During the
postconviction stage, however, these lesser sanctions are no longer an
option. Moreover, while the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure severely
restrict the trial court's power to disturb a guilty verdict or alter the original
sentence,292 courts are not bound by these same restrictions when
sanctioning the wrongful destruction of discoverable evidence.
A. Sentence Reduction
One appropriate sanction that courts can impose to redress wrongful
evidence destruction during the postconviction stage of a case is a sentence
reduction. Courts have generally only imposed a sentence reduction
sanction when the impact of the destroyed evidence was limited to
individual charges in a multicount indictment or when the destroyed
evidence was relevant to the more serious charge in the indictment, but did
not affect the lesser-included offense. 293 Reducing the original sentence
291. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 167, at 960 (maintaining that courts should seek to
impose sanctions that, to the greatest extent possible, do not affect the evidence at trial and
the merits of the case).
292. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a) ("Upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any
judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a)
("Within 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error."); see, e.g., United States v. Galvan-Perez, 291
F.3d 401, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the trial court's reduction in sentence as an
impermissible "change of heart"); United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.
2001) (characterizing the granting of a new trial as "a rarely used power"); see also Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408-12 (1993) (discussing state procedural restrictions on
postconviction requests for a new trial); Risinger, supra note 203, at 1315 nn.168-70
(discussing the limitations on the power of a court to grant a new trial on the grounds of
insufficiency of the evidence).
293. People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 55 (Colo. 1985); People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist.
Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Colo. 1983); People v. Saddy, 445 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (App.
Div. 1981); People v. White, 604 N.Y.S.2d 688, 692 (Sup. Ct. 1993). In People v. Sheppard,
the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a vehicular manslaughter count of an
indictment as a sanction for a Brady violation. Sheppard, 701 P.2d at 55. The government's
destruction of defendant's car prior to trial prevented the defendant from establishing that the
car accident was caused by mechanical failure. Id. Nevertheless, the court allowed the
government to proceed on the lesser, included charge of driving under the influence. Id. In
People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, the Colorado Supreme Court found that a
reduction of a first-degree charge to a second-degree charge was an appropriate sanction
where the nonpreservation of evidence prevented the defendant from proving that the victim
was armed prior to the fatal encounter. Gallagher, 656 P.2d at 1293. In People v. Saddy, a
New York court vacated the defendant's convictions for sale of controlled substances and
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing solely on lesser, included drug
possession charges unaffected by the destroyed evidence. Saddy, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 605. In
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imposed to sanction evidence destruction has not been upheld when there
was not a close nexus between the specific charges and the evidence
destroyed 294 or when a less drastic remedy was available to cure the harm
caused by nondisclosure.
295
The use of a sentence reduction as a sanction in postconviction DNA
cases will likely be an appropriate sanction only in a very limited number of
cases. In cases like Lovitt, a sentence reduction might be an appropriate
sanction when the DNA evidence, had it been preserved, would not have
provided dispositive evidence of factual innocence, but could have severely
weakened the government's case.296 This is especially true in death penalty
cases where courts would have the option of reducing the death sentence to
life without the possibility of parole. Since 1973, there have been 130
exonerations of death row inmates. 297 Of these, there have been seventeen
cases in which DNA was a "substantial factor" in the exoneration. 298 Given
the number of exonerations in capital cases and the greater degree of
certitude demanded in these cases, a court should, at a minimum, strongly
consider reducing the death sentence to life in prison when the condemned
prisoner is wrongly denied access to DNA evidence. By contrast, in the
majority of cases, the prisoner seeking DNA testing on biological evidence
has been convicted of rape, and the biological evidence, if preserved, would
prove factual innocence of all charges. Thus, imposing a sentence
reduction to sanction the wrongful destruction of DNA evidence would not
cure the harm caused by the destruction.
People v. White, a New York trial court held that the destruction of a stolen car by the
government prevented the defendant from contesting an element of the offense-that the
value of car exceeded $3000-but a lesser charge of fourth-degree criminal possession-
requiring that the stolen goods have a value over $100-was allowed since the establishment
of this element was unaffected by the government's loss of evidence. White, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
692.
294. See, e.g., People v. Corso, 521 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (App. Div. 1987) (finding trial
court error for the dismissal of a drug charge as a sanction for a Brady violation where
undisclosed evidence related only to a separate murder count).
295. People v. Roan, 685 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Colo. 1984) (holding that the court abused its
discretion in reducing a vehicular homicide charge to DUI as a sanction for failure to
preserve evidence related to blood-alcohol level where a less drastic remedy was available to
cure prejudice to the defense).
296. In fact, the granting of clemency by Governor Mark Warner was a form of sentence
reduction in Lovitt. As discussed infra, the biological evidence that was wrongly destroyed,
standing alone, would not have completely exonerated Robin Lovitt, but could have
undermined the strength of the government's key argument at trial that there was reason to
believe that Lovitt was the source of the "inconclusive" blood deposited on the murder
weapon and that the "inconclusive" blood on Lovitt's jacket was the victim's blood. See
supra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
297. Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Mar. 29, 2009)
(reporting information as of September 2008); see also Gross et al., supra note 151, at 529
(noting that sixty-one out of seventy-four death row exonerations were non-DNA).
298. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 297 (noting the seventeen




Another postconviction sanction for the wrongful destruction of DNA
evidence is granting a new trial.299 Like the sentence reduction sanction,
granting a new trial likely will be an appropriate remedy in a very limited
number of cases. As one court observed, when the evidence has been
completely destroyed, "[a] new trial would be simply a repetition of the first
trial, similarly infected by non-disclosure of discoverable evidence. '300 In
some cases, however, a new trial might be an appropriate sanction if the
court concurrently imposes other remedial measures to compensate for the
loss of evidence. First, the court would have the discretion to prevent the
government from introducing any forensic evidence to prove identity at the
retrial, including all previously conducted DNA tests and all non-DNA
forensic analysis. 30 1 At a time when juries sometimes have unrealistic
expectations of cutting-edge, scientific proof of guilt, the so-called "CSI
Effect, '302 excluding forensic evidence could have a significant impact,
especially where the government relied heavily on forensic evidence to
prove identity at the initial trial. In Lovitt, for example, although DNA
testing was inclusive with respect to some of the blood on the knife and all
of the blood on Robin Lovitt's jacket, these inconclusive DNA results gave
the government leeway to argue that Lovitt's blood might have been on the
knife and the victim could have been the source of the blood on Lovitt's
jacket. If all of the forensic evidence was excluded at a new trial as a
sanction for the government's failure to preserve biological evidence, the
government's case at retrial would rest largely on the tepid eyewitness
identification and the questionable testimony of the jailhouse informant.
In addition to excluding forensic evidence, a new trial sanction could also
include a strongly worded adverse inference or "missing evidence"
instruction.303  Courts have crafted adverse evidence instructions that
simply inform the jury of missing evidence, 304 inform the jury that the
299. See supra notes 92, 115, 146, and accompanying text.
300. United States v. Bryant (Bryant 1), 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir.), aftd, 448 F.2d
1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 59
(D. Mass. 1994) (finding that Jencks evidence was wrongly destroyed and ordering a new
trial because the court found that the evidence could be reconstructed at retrial).
301. See State v. Mitchell, 683 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the
proper remedy for the state's destruction of semen samples in a rape case was the exclusion
of blood-grouping evidence derived from a prior analysis of destroyed evidence); Tinsley v.
Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1989) (ruling that, on remand, the trial court should determine
whether the government's presentation of evidence should be limited or prohibited as a
sanction for its failure to properly preserve discoverable evidence).
302. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 189 (manuscript at 1-10 to 1-
11); see also Wendy Brickell, Is It the CSI Effect or Do We Just Distrust Juries?, CIM.
JUST., Summer 2008, at 10, 11.
303. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989). In Fain, the court suggested the
following sample jury instruction for a case involving missing evidence:
You may take note of the fact that the state had obtained bodily fluid samples from
the body of the victim, that such samples are, as a matter of law, material evidence
in that scientific tests are available which may exclude an individual from that
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evidence was wrongly destroyed,30 5 or even direct the jury to assume
adverse facts based on the wrongful destruction of evidence by the
government. 306 While trial courts have great discretion in determining
whether to give a missing evidence or adverse inference instruction, and
even greater discretion in selecting the language of the instruction,
specifically tailored instructions can serve to ameliorate some of the
prejudice caused by the loss of DNA evidence. 30 7
C. Vacating the Sentence/Dismissal
The broad authority given to state courts under innocence protection laws
to impose "appropriate sanctions" to redress evidence destruction includes
the authority to vacate a conviction. 308 While it is clear that courts have
this sanctioning authority, dismissal is the most severe sanction and is
regarded as a "disfavored remedy" that should not be imposed when a less
class of persons who could have committed the crime, that the state lost or
destroyed the samples, and that the defendant therefore did not have an
opportunity to conduct such tests. The fact that the state lost or destroyed the
samples does not, in itself, require that you acquit the defendant. It is, however,
one factor for you to consider in your deliberations.
Id. at 266.
305. See, e.g., Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 962 n.6 (Del. 1992). The missing evidence
instruction in Lolly v. State stated, in part,
In this case the court has determined that the State failed to collect/preserve
certain evidence which is material to the defense. The failure of the State to
collect/preserve such evidence entitles the defendant to an inference that if such
evidence were available at trial it would be exculpatory. This means that, for
purposes of deciding this case, you are to assume that the missing evidence, had it
been collected/preserved, would not have incriminated the defendant and would
have tended to prove the defendant not guilty.
Id.
306. See, e.g., People v. Zamora, 615 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Cal. 1980). In People v. Zamora,
government records concerning past complaints of abuse filed against police officers were
destroyed intentionally. Id. The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction, and, as a sanction, mandated an adverse inference instruction that informed the
jury (1) that the police officers had used excessive force in the past, (2) that the records of
the officers' past misconduct were destroyed by the government, (3) that the jury could infer
that these officers were "prone to use excessive or unnecessary force," and (4) that the
officers' testimony regarding these past incidents "may be biased." Id.
307. See generally 4 ToM LUNDY, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMPENDIUM
§ 36.1.1 (2008), available at http://www.juryinstruction.com/toc.shtml (password and paid
registration required) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (listing numerous sample
instructions from various jurisdictions). One such example is the following:
[C]onsider any evidence that the government or its agents either failed to preserve
or destroyed or discarded relevant evidence as affirmative evidence of the
weakness of the government's case This evidence, alone or in combination with
other matters, may leave you with a reasonable doubt entitling the defendant to an
acquittal.
Id.
308. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-lA-2(F) (LexisNexis 2003) ("The district court may
impose appropriate sanctions, including dismissal of the petitioner's conviction or criminal
contempt, if the court determines that evidence was intentionally destroyed after issuance of
the court's order to secure evidence.").
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drastic sanction would redress the disclosure violation. 30 9 In postconviction
litigation, however, dismissal may be the only appropriate sanction
available to the court when dispositive DNA evidence is destroyed. A
major concern with dismissal, however, is the risk of "freeing the guilty."
In light of the fact that postconviction DNA testing confirms the guilt of the
prisoner in fifty percent of the cases, 310 this concern is justified. Also,
DNA evidence is generally only available in rape and murder cases, both of
which carry sentences of twenty or more years in prison. 311 Thus, even
when evidence has been wrongly destroyed and postconviction DNA
testing is no longer possible, judges may be reluctant to exercise their
discretion to vacate the conviction if there is a chance that a guilty person
might be released.
The risk of potentially "freeing the guilty," however, must yield to the
paramount goal of "freeing the innocent." As Justice John Marshall Harlan
recognized long ago, "In a criminal case . . . we do not view the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty. '312 To underscore the fundamental value
of protecting the rights of the innocent, Justice Harlan also famously stated,
"[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free." 313 Given the now undisputed fact that factually innocent people are
convicted in our justice system, 314 the risk of "convicting the innocent" can
309. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1273 n.2 (R.I. 1998) (quoting United States v.
Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1988)); see People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.S.2d 516, 520 (City
Ct. 1984) (stating that the "drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less
severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence").
310. Garrett, supra note 151, at 109; Jones, supra note 18, at 1267 n.132. The case of
Roger Coleman provides a poignant illustration of this point. Coleman steadfastly
maintained his innocence after being convicted of capital murder for the extremely brutal
rape and murder of his sister-in-law. Due to the intense public pressure from the media and
Coleman's advocates for nearly a decade after his conviction, Virginia Governor Mark
Warner ordered a DNA analysis of the biological evidence in the case after Coleman's
execution that confirmed Coleman's guilt. See Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests
Confirm Guilt of Man Executed by Va., WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A 1.
311. Of the first 200 DNA exonerations, 77% were in cases involving rape or murder. In
fact, only 3 cases did not involve a charge of rape, murder, or both. Garrett, supra note 151,
at 73-74. Of 340 DNA and non-DNA exonerations from 1989-2003, 96% were for rape,
murder, or both. Gross, supra note 151, at 529.
312. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
313. Id.; see also Boon v. State, I Ga. 618, 631 (1846) ("[H]owever unwilling we may be
to see the guilty escape, we are still more so to establish a precedent, which would jeopardize
the safety of the innocent."); Findley, supra note 202, at 135 (stating that, to advance the
ideal of protecting the innocent over convicting the guilty, "our constitutional scheme
purports to put most of the risk of error on the prosecution").
314. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (recognizing that a state prisoner
could mount an effective collateral attack on a state court conviction by presenting evidence
that establishes a "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'); see also House v.
Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006) (reaffirming the miscarriage-of-justice exception to the
procedural restrictions on habeas corpus petitions when state court prisoners present
sufficient evidence of actual innocence).
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no longer be dismissed as a remote possibility or theoretical notion.315
Therefore, the sanction of dismissal is justified when DNA evidence is
destroyed in violation of innocence protection laws.
Moreover, the risk of "freeing the guilty" is significantly reduced in
many cases involving factual innocence claims due to the presence of
strong, independent evidence of innocence. Among the first 200 DNA
exonerations, in many cases, years before obtaining exculpatory DNA
results, prisoners presented credible, non-DNA evidence of actual
innocence that cast serious doubt on the guilty verdict. This exculpatory
evidence included credible confessions to the crime by third parties,
recantations of testimony by victims and key witnesses, and various acts of
prosecutorial and police misconduct.316 Although courts have found this
exculpatory evidence insufficient to grant postconviction relief under
postconviction review standards, this evidence should provide the court
with a solid basis for vacating the conviction as a sanction when DNA
evidence has been destroyed. Two cases provide a brief illustration of this
point. In People v. Dotson,317 the very first postconviction DNA
exoneration, 318 Gary Dotson was convicted of a brutal rape of a teenage
girl.319  Years later, the victim, now a mature woman, recanted her
fabricated trial testimony under oath. Despite numerous postconviction
hearings and other proceedings, Mr. Dotson was unable to obtain relief
from his wrongful conviction until several years later when DNA testing
proved his actual innocence. 320 Similarly, in People v. Cruz,321 Rolando
315. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our society has a high degree
of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent."); United States v. Garsson, 291 F.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) ("Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the
accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream."); see also Risinger, supra note 203, at 1334-35 & n.297.
316. See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 252. The wrongful conviction of
Christopher Ochoa and Richard Danziger was based, in part, on the coerced confession of
Ochoa. Id. at 9-10. Achim Marino, a convicted felon serving three life sentences, wrote
letters confessing to the crime and directing police to the hidden location of evidence related
to the crime, including the murder weapon. Id. Despite this evidence, Ochoa and Danziger
were not exonerated until six years later when DNA analysis of biological evidence collected
from the rape victim excluded Ochoa and Danziger and identified Marino. Id. In State v.
Elkins, an appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that a child rape victim's posttrial
recantation was not credible and denied the defendant a new trial. No. 21380, 2003 WL
22015409, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003). Three years after the recantation by the
victim, who was also the sole eyewitness, the defendant and his wife obtained DNA testing
on the crime scene evidence that excluded the defendant and inculpated Earl Mann, a
convicted rapist who lived near the victim at the time of the crime. See The Innocence
Project, Know the Cases: Clarence Elkins, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/92.php
(last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
317. 516 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
318. Gross et al., supra note 151, at 523.
319. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 720 (explaining that complainant testified that she falsely
reported being raped because she had a sexual relationship with her boyfriend and believed
she was pregnant).
320. Id. at 722 (upholding the denial of the motion to vacate the sentence and finding the
complaining witness not credible in recanting her trial testimony).
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Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez were both wrongly convicted and sentenced
to death for the rape and murder of Jeanine Nicarico, a ten-year-old girl.322
Postconviction, Brian Dugan, a convicted sex offender and serial killer,
came forward and confessed to the Nicarico murder and confessed to two
other rape-murders and three other rapes. 323 Dugan also gave details about
the various crimes, many of which had a very similar modus operandi and
were corroborated by testimony from other witnesses. 324 Despite this
evidence, the defendants were not exonerated until DNA analysis excluded
Cruz and Hernandez and implicated Dugan as the perpetrator. 325
The dismissal remedy should not, however, be restricted to cases where
there is independent exculpatory evidence. Two other cases illustrate this
point. In State v. Fain,326 Charles Fain was convicted of capital murder for
the brutal rape, kidnapping, and drowning of a nine-year-old girl.327
Pretrial, during trial, and on appeal, Fain steadfastly argued that he was
denied due process because the government failed to preserve potentially
exculpatory swabs of bodily fluid taken from the victim during the
autopsy.328 The trial court found that the swabs containing semen from the
victim's assailant were inadvertently discarded by the pathologist, and that,
if preserved, the evidence could have been subjected to serological testing
to exclude Fain. 329 Despite these findings, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
the denial of the motion to dismiss based on the destruction of the evidence,
finding that dismissal would be "an overly severe sanction" in light of the
"significant and weighty" circumstantial evidence of guilt presented at
trial. 330 Principally, the evidence of guilt adduced at trial consisted of the
testimony of two jailhouse informants and inculpatory forensic analysis of
the pubic hair found on the victim's underwear.331 By 2000, DNA analysis
could be performed on the pubic hairs removed from the victim's clothing.
DNA analysis revealed that Charles Fain was not the source of the pubic
321. 643 N.E.2d 636 (I11. 1994)
322. Id. at 666-67.
323. Id. at 645-46.
324. Id. at 645-48.
325. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Meet the Exonerated: Rolando Cruz,
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilCruzSummary.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2009); see also FRISBE & GARRETr, supra note 259, at 56-75; TUROW,
supra note 259, at 3-8.
326. 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989).
327. Id. at 254-55, 268.
328. Id. at 257-61.
329. Id. at 261.
330. Id. at 267.
331. Id. at 255, 267.
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hairs.3 32 In 2001, after eighteen years on death row, Fain was exonerated
and released from prison.
333
Perhaps no case is a more apt and ironic illustration of the injustice that
can result from the failure to use the dismissal sanction than the case of
Larry Youngblood, the litigant at the center of the landmark Supreme Court
case, Arizona v. Youngblood.334 Larry Youngblood was convicted of
kidnapping, molesting, and repeatedly sodomizing a ten-year-old boy.
Following the brutal assault, the young victim was taken to the hospital,
where biological evidence (seminal fluid) was collected from the child's
body and clothing.335 The child later made a photo identification of Larry
Youngblood as the assailant. 336  The government never conducted
serological tests on the biological evidence, and it was later discovered that,
due to improper storage, the samples had deteriorated to the point where
scientific analysis was no longer possible. 337 At trial, Youngblood denied
involvement and maintained that, if the evidence had been properly
preserved, serological testing could have excluded Youngblood as the
perpetrator.338 Following his conviction, Youngblood was sentenced to
more than ten years in prison. Youngblood unsuccessfully litigated whether
the government's failure to preserve the evidence constituted a due process
violation. 339 Although the original biological evidence was deemed too
degraded for serological analysis, by 2000, DNA analysis on the evidence
revealed that Youngblood was not the perpetrator.
340
In sum, imposing a sentence reduction or granting a new trial will likely
serve as an appropriate sanction in a small minority of cases to address the
wrongful destruction of DNA evidence. In most cases, the sanction of
dismissal will be the appropriate remedy. In fact, given the superior
persuasive power of DNA evidence and the paramount goal of protecting
the innocent from the fate of a wrongful conviction, dismissal should be the
presumptive remedy when the court determines that DNA analysis of
biological evidence, if preserved, could have exonerated the defendant.
332. See case profiles at The Center on Wrongful Convictions, Charles I. Fain,
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/idFainSummary.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2009); The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Charles Irvin Fain,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/149.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
333. See The Center on Wrongful Convictions, supra note 332; The Innocence Project,
supra note 332.
334. 488 U.S. 51, 52 (1988); see also supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
335. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52-53.
336. Id. at 53.
337. Id. at 53-54.
338. Id. at 54.
339. Id. at 56.
340. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/303.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). Not only did
the DNA analysis exonerate Larry Youngblood, it also matched another man, Walter Cruise,
who was subsequently convicted of the crime and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of well over 200 DNA exonerations and the passage of
innocence protection laws in nearly every jurisdiction in the country, courts
have a definite role to play in ensuring that biological evidence needed for
DNA testing is properly preserved and available for disclosure. The use of
judicial sanctions to redress the wrongful destruction of biological evidence
can serve as a catalyst to usher in systemic reforms in the criminal justice
system. Sanctions will also advance the goal of correcting wrongful
convictions and repairing the tarnished integrity of an imperfect criminal
justice system.
